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Rabu, 17 Agustus 2011

U.S. Births Down In 2009

CAVEAT: Trapped in a blog time warp - originally posted in May.

Births fell from an all-time high in 2007 of 4,316,233 to 4,131,019 in 2009, a decline of 4 percent. . . . In 2007, there were 69.5 births per 1,000 women ages 15 to 44 compared with 66.7 in 2009. This is referred to by NCHS as the fertility rate, but is also often called the general fertility rate (GFR).



By age, the largest decline was among women ages 20 to 24. Childbearing fell from 106.3 births pr 1,000 women in that group in 2007 to 96.3 in 2009, a 9 percent decline. . . . Fertility among the 25-to-29 age group, the next older, fell by 6 percent. That group, which has had the highest rate in recent years, dropped from 117.5 in 2007 to 110.5 in 2009. The decline was far less, only 2 percent among women in their 30s and even rose among women in their 40s, although latter group has much lower rates. . . .



[F]ertility rates have fallen . . . : 3% for non-Hispanic whites between 2007 and 2009, 4% for non-Hispanic blacks, 9% for Hispanics, 3% for American Indians and Alaskan natives, and 4% for Asian and Pacific islanders.


From here



The likely cause for the slump is the financial crisis and recession that followed. Birth rates are mildly cyclic. The U.S. has one of the highest fertility rates in the developed world, which was hovering at just over the replacement rate in 2007. The slump probably brings the U.S. to a bit below the replacement rate (which is about 2100 children per 1000 women per lifetime).



The shift accentuates the recent trend of fertility rates declining more for lower income, minority, and younger women, while declining less or increasingly among more affluent and older women, in substantial part due to fertility treatments (a trend that has also greatly increased the number of multiple births and parental age related congenital conditions). The last decade or so is the first time in almost a century in which affluent people have more children than less affluent people.



It is also a fit to the fact that the recession has dampened new household formation, and has pushed people into high school and college and out of the labor force.



While teen births are at near record lows, about 40% of all births are to unmarried mothers, including majorities of births to African-American and Native American women.



As an aside, fertility rates in some of the Baltic states are finally starting to recover after a profound post-communist era slump.
READ MORE - U.S. Births Down In 2009

Jumat, 22 Juli 2011

GOP Getting More White, Democratic Party, Less So

Race has come to be a bigger factor in party identification from 2008 to 2011.

Whites have become more likely to ID as Republican. A majority of whites in every adult age group, and every income group of $30,000 per year+ is majority Republican. Low incomer income whites are still more likely to identify as Republican than Democratic, and have seen GOP party ID leap by ten percentage points in three years. GOP identification has also risen by ten percentage points among whites aged 18-29. Overall 52% of whites are Republicans and 39% are Democrats now. GOP identification rates are increasingly similar across all ages and income groups for whites.

There was a small increase in black GOP identification (from 6% to 8%), but that may be simply a statistical blip that is a produce of modest sample sizes; 86% of blacks identify politically as Democrats. Also, the two percentage point gain in blacks is still smaller in percentage point terms than the four percentage point gain for the overall population for Republicans: voters overall are 43% Republican and 47% Democratic in their political identity.

Republican identification among Hispanics has dropped six percentage points to 22% Republican and 64% Democratic. (The numbers don't total to 100% because one can be independent or affiliate with a third party.) The situation with Hispanics is really more complicated than it appears because on important Hispanic subgroup, Cuban-Americans, which is significant mostly in Florida, accounts for a disproportionate share of Hispanic Republicans.

This source doesn't have a regional breakdown. My suspicion is that Southern whites are Republicans at much higher rates than other whites. It may be the by far dominant party for Southern whites who are also more likely to vote the party line, while whites outside the South may be fairly evenly split between the political parties and less reliable in voting for their political party.

The apparent shift in party ID may mostly be a product of conservative white Democrats in the South (Dixiecrats) either dying, becoming Republicans (perhaps in response to President Obama's Presidency) or aging out of younger age brackets, while their children and grandchildren identify as Republicans from the start. In other words, it may be just one more manifestation of the continuing process of "realignment" in which the Democratic party becomes more purely politically liberal, and the Republican party becomes more purely politically conservative, rather than a shift in political opinion by race.

In terms of brand identification, realignment is great. It is easier than every to know what each party stands for and inform one's vote accordingly. But, since elected officials run on major party tickets, it may be harder than it used to be for a political moderate to get elected on either major party ticket. And, an absence of political moderates can produce the political deadlocks we see today.
READ MORE - GOP Getting More White, Democratic Party, Less So

Jumat, 03 Juni 2011

The Mass Migration Of The Late 19th Century

On average, 5 percent of the populations of Britain, Ireland, and Norway emigrated every decade between 1850 and 1910, which increased to 14 percent of the Irish population emigrating between 1890 and 1910. By the turn of the century, Italy, Portugal, and Spain recorded similar emigration levels... The Swedish population fell by 44 percent in the twenty-year period from 1871-1890.

Massive immigration dramatically impacted the economies of countries in the New World, which had relatively small populations. Between 1880 and 1910, Argentina received the equivalent of 20 percent of its population per decade; the United States between 5 and 10 percent per decade; and Canada between 5 and 15 percent per decade. Immigration in this age of mass migration accounted for around 50 percent of Argentina's population increase, and about a 30 percent increase for the United States and Australia.

From here quoting this book. A comment to the linked post references regarding immigration politics of the time: Goldin, C, “The Political Economy of Immigration Restriction in the United States, 1890 to 1921.” In The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, ed. C. Goldin and G.D. Libecap, 223-258. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

What was so awful in Europe that everyone wanted to get the heck out of there? Stories of misery and poverty driving people to leave Ireland after the potato famine and Southern Italy are familiar from immigrant narratives. But, I'm not familiar with any similar narrative for late 19th century Sweden. Yet, surely you wouldn't see a 44% exodus of Swedes from their homeland in twenty years if everything was fine and dandy in Sweden. Sure, the northern Midwest is full of Swedish Lutherans, but it had never occured to me that they would have emigrated in such large numbers relative to the population of Sweden. I'd always imagined that event as something more like a small subculture young people who set out to seek their fortune because the grass was reputed to be greener across the Atlantic, answering a call that most people ignored.

My own family history recounts the looming war of 1848 as a push factor in the migration of my patrilineal ancestor to the United States from Germany.

But, the story of my maternal Swede-Finn ancestors' migratration from Finland to the Upper Pennisula of Michigan a few decades later as teenagers isn't accompanied by a narrative that would suggest any push factor that dramatic. (Finland was a Grand Dutchy within Russia from 1809 to 1917, having been acquired in resolution of a war between tsarist Russia and Sweden, and was previously a part of the Swedish empire; Finnish emigration peaked around 1900, a bit later than than Swedish neighbors, perhaps because it industrialized a little later.)

According to Wikipedia:

Sweden—much like Japan at the same time—transformed from a stagnant rural society to a vibrant industrial society between the 1860s and 1910. The agricultural economy shifted gradually from communal village to a more efficient private farm-based agriculture. There was less need for manual labor on the farm so many went to the cities; and about 1 million Swedes emigrated to the United States between 1850 and 1890. Many returned and brought word of the higher productivity of American industry, thus stimulating faster modernization.

The late 19th century saw the emergence of an opposition press, the abolition of guild monopolies on craftsmen, and the reform of taxation. Two years of military service was made compulsory for young men, though there was no warfare.

Health

The steady decline of death rates in Sweden began about 1810. For men and women of working age the death rate trend diverged, however, leading to increased excess male mortality during the first half of the century. There were very high rates of infant and child mortality before 1800, Among infants and children between the ages of one and four smallpox peaked as a cause of death in the 1770s-1780s and declined afterward. Mortality also peaked . . . due to other air-, food-, and waterborne diseases, but these declined as well during the early 19th century. The decline of several diseases during this time created a more favorable environment that increased children's resistance to disease and dramatically lowered child mortality.

Thus, rather than war or disease, the push factor appears to have been an increased supply of young people as mortality fell with modernity accompanied by a declining job market due to the mechanization of the economy. There are parallels to the enclosure movement in Britain as well as to the mass displacement of tenant-farmers in Japan referenced in Wikipedia. The coincidence of the imposition of compulsory military service and the mass migration is also notable.

This example also suggests give the very large percentages involved relative to the populations involved on both ends of the journey that there was a strong potential for population genetic selection in the New World for any trait that would predispose someone to make a migration and in the Old World for any trait that would predispose someone to not making a migration.
READ MORE - The Mass Migration Of The Late 19th Century

Selasa, 24 Mei 2011

Crime Down In 2010 (Fifth Year In Row)

Crime levels fell across the board last year, extending a multiyear downward trend with a 5.5 percent drop in the number of violent crimes in 2010 and a 2.8 percent decline in the number of property crimes.

Year-to-year changes released Monday by the FBI in its preliminary figures on crimes reported to police in 2010 also showed declines in all four categories of violent crime in 2010. All categories for property crime went down as well. . . .

Violent crime last increased in 2005. Property crime last rose in 2002.

The FBI reported that violent crime fell in all four regions of the country last year — 7.5 percent in the South, 5.9 in the Midwest, 5.8 percent in the West and 0.4 percent in the Northeast.

From here.

Yesterday's new showed divorce rates down in Colorado. Teen pregnancy continues to hover near all time lows.

Also in the news, and possibly one explanation for the shift was the results of a new survey showing that the percentage of children ages 3-17 diagnosed with ADHD had increased from 5.7% for 1997-1999 to 7.6% for 2006-2008.

The economy can't explain the decline. The regional trends don't match immigration trends. Incarceration rates have been relatively stable in this time period. But, one thing that has changed and drives a disproportionate share of the year to year variation in crime, is the changing drug scene.

Domestic meth production is dramatically down. Illegal use of prescription drugs is up. A significant share of the illegal marijuana market has shifted to the legal medical marijuana market. Cocaine use isn't particularly high. There has been a pretty dramatic increase in legal use of drugs for mental health conditions.

One way to read the recent trend is that a lot of people who used to be self-medicating with illegal drugs supplied by a rough and tumble world of gangs and organized crime are finding chemicals to address their problems through distribution channels that don't drive street crime to nearly the same degree and provide a much more predictable product.

An alternative and not necessarily inconsistent possibility is that we are reaping the benefits of a long economic boom from the early 1980s until 2007, interrupted by only relatively brief and mild recessions. People may commit crimes on impulse, but a lifestyle that leads to commiting serious crime with little hesitation and routinely committing less serious crimes is decades in the making. A long period of relative plenty may have narrowed the pool of people who were in dire poverty as young children and became more predisposed towards crime as a result.

A third possibility is that technology is making it harder and less profitable to commit many crimes. People carry less cash. Cars have more anti-theft devices. Bank robbers and rapists are more likely to get caught. The decline in meth was driven by more strict control of the ingredients that go into it.

Whatever the reason, it is hard to deny that it is good news.
READ MORE - Crime Down In 2010 (Fifth Year In Row)

Selasa, 15 Februari 2011

Cohabitation Agreements

39 percent [of divorce lawyers] report an increase in the number of cohabitation agreements that protect property and other assets for partners living outside the perimeters of legally recognized marriages.

Rare in some areas of the country as recently as 15 or 20 years ago, such contracts are coming into their own, said Ken Altshuler, the group's president-elect in Portland, Maine. "They're really on the cutting edge of relationships today as more people move in together." The elite organization of divorce lawyers strongly advises cohabitation agreements for unmarried heterosexual couples along with same-sex partners whose unions are not legally recognized, especially when children are adopted by one but not both partners.

"To go to court to enforce your rights is just very expensive," said Susan Bender, a Manhattan lawyer who routinely handles cohabitation agreements for same-sex couples.

"Otherwise there's litigation, the hiring of an attorney," she said. "It's dispiriting to young couples to come into my office to begin their romantic relationship with figuring out who gets the IRA, but it makes so much sense." . . . cohabitation agreements can protect an unmarried person's stake in jointly owned property like a house or a condo and guard against seizure for payment of spousal debt.

"If we break up and there's no agreement, I don't have a claim," Viken said. "The litigation between two people who own a house together and aren't married is much more difficult than two married people who are getting divorced." About 30 percent of the attorneys who responded to the survey said a majority of cohabitation agreements they draw up are for same-sex couples. With only a handful of states recognizing gay marriage, the agreements can spell out legal rights both in and out of state.


From here.

Colorado doesn't recognize gay marriage and while the Colorado General Assembly is considering a civil unions bill this session, which I support, it doesn't have one yet.

I tend to call them domestic partnership agreements, but I prepare them and taught financial planners about the circumstances when they are useful and the terms they should contain when I was a professor.
READ MORE - Cohabitation Agreements

Rabu, 09 Februari 2011

Ancient Rome v Pre-Industrial London

In "The Fall of Rome: And the End of Civilization," Bryan Ward-Perkins reports that the pollutants which are the byproducts of industrial activity did not reach Roman levels in Britain until the 18th century! I am not naive enough to be such a partisan of the “ancients” as to suggest that Europe did not reach Roman levels of civilization in the generality until the 1700s. But, up until the Industrial Revolution occurred in Britain there were aspects of European civilization which had not yet climbed back up to the Roman scale of grandeur or virtuosity. For example, it seems that it was only in 1800 that London attained the size of the city of ancient Classical Rome (which had fallen in its nadir in the 7th century to a population of 50,000).


- Per Razib (links omitted, punctuation added in lieu of link emphasis).
READ MORE - Ancient Rome v Pre-Industrial London

Rabu, 02 Februari 2011

Illegal immigrant population shrinking (updated)

The Great Recession has greatly reduced employment in industries that employ large numbers of undocumented workers (e.g. construction). The result has been a decline in the undocumented population of the United States and in particular Colorado, where the number of undocumented individuals has fallen about 25% (from 240,000 to 180,000) in the three years since 2007.

About 28% of foreign nationals in the United States are undocumented, and about half of undocumented foreign nationals in the United States are Mexican nationals.

Updated February 3, 2011:

In Colorado, the undocumented immigrant population is about 3.6% of the total population.

Nationally, about two-thirds of undocumented immigrants are in the labor force, which would imply about 120,000 people in Colorado. There are 2,665,200 people in Colorado's civilian labor force. So, undocumented immigrants make up about 4.5% of Colorado's labor force.

A crude estimate that assumes that reducing the undocumented immigrant labor force percentage by one percentage point would reduce Colorado's unemployment rate of 8.8% is almost surely wrong, however. In part, this is because undocumented workers generate jobs, both by creating firms and by consuming goods and services and paying taxes that generate jobs, as well as filling jobs. In part, this is because undocumented workers have skill and abilities that aren't present in the general labor force to the same degree, and because employers won't necessarily be able to connect their jobs to unemployed people in Colorado generally. In part, this is because some undocumented workers are themselves unemployed. In part, this is because some jobs done by undocumented immigrants are done at below market rates that are a result of their undocumented status (e.g. getting paid "under the table"), and some of those jobs wouldn't be economically viable at legal labor market rates.

It is quite probable that reducing the undocumented immigrant labor force would reduce unemployment somewhat for other workers in the labor force, but it is hard to estimate what magnitude that effect would have on the unemployment rate.

Probably the best way to estimate that effect would be to do a regression analysis that compared unemployment rates to the percentage of the labor force in each state or region that was comprised of undocumented immigrants. Given the high rate of unemployment across the nation in states with very different rates of undocumented immigrant participation in the labor force, the impact must be fairly modest.

A more sophisticated and more accurate analysis might look instead at undocumented immigrant participatioon in the labor force by both industry and region and do a regression that way (since the mix of industries in a region strongly influences its unemploymenmt rate and the involvement of undocumented immigrants in the labor force varies greatly by industry).

I suspect that this kind of analysis would reveal that undocumented immigration makes a pretty modest contribution to unemployment in the Rust Belt, where manufacturing is dominant, or in the farming states, but makes an appreciable difference in states where the construction industry and hospitality industries are a larger share of the economy, like Nevada.
READ MORE - Illegal immigrant population shrinking (updated)

Egypt Is Population Dominant In the Region



I'd planned on doing this myself, but Yglesias has already done the work.

Algeria and Iraq have experienced regime change relatively recently, making those regimes probably less prone to being displaced than elsewhere. I would also add North Sudan (a bit under 30 million), Libya (6.4 million), Morocco (about 32 million), and Western Sahara (about 400,000) to his list.

I also note that the term "Arab" as used by Yglesias is basically a political self-identifier (as in the "Arab League") and as a proxy for a significantly Arabic language speaking population, rather than ethnically Arab populations.

The populations of North Africa and Egypt respectively are mostly not members of the same ethnic group as the once nomadic people of the Arabian Peninsula, despite their strong cultural affinities to each other relative to the rest of the world. While all of these populations historically spoke Afro-Asiatic langauges, prior to the expansion of the Islamic empire (ca. 700 CE plus or minus a few decades) the North Africans spoke mostly Berber languages, the Egyptians spoke mostly Coptic languages, and the Arabs spoke Semitic languages. The Islamic empire's expansion was not a population replacing one; mostly it grew by rapidly assimilating existing populations into new languages, religions and cultures.
READ MORE - Egypt Is Population Dominant In the Region

Senin, 31 Januari 2011

One in seven marriages is mixed race.

One in seven (14.6%) of new marriages in 2008 and 2009 is mixed race (in a method that counts a Hispanic-Anglo marriage as mixed race), according to a recent New York Times article reporting on a Pew Research Center study from June of last year. In 1960, the figure was 2.4%.

Among all newlyweds in 2008, 9% of whites, 16% of blacks, 26% of Hispanics and 31% of Asians married someone whose race or ethnicity was different from their own.

Gender patterns in intermarriage vary widely. Some 22% of all black male newlyweds in 2008 married outside their race [in 1960 the percentage was 1.3%], compared with just 9% of black female newlyweds [in 1960 the percentage was 0.9%]. Among Asians, the gender pattern runs the other way. Some 40% of Asian female newlyweds married outside their race in 2008, compared with just 20% of Asian male newlyweds. Among whites and Hispanics, by contrast, there are no gender differences in intermarriage rates.

Rates of intermarriages among newlyweds in the U.S. more than doubled between 1980 (6.7%) and 2008 (14.6%). However, different groups experienced different trends. Rates more than doubled among whites and nearly tripled among blacks. But for both Hispanics and Asians, rates were nearly identical in 2008 and 1980. . . . ["High levels of Hispanic and Asian immigration over the past several decades helped drive both seemingly contradictory trends."] . . .

Native-born Hispanics are more than three times as likely as the foreign born to marry a non-Hispanic. . . native-born Asian-Americans are nearly twice as likely as those who are foreign born to marry a non-Asian. . . Among Asian men, the native born are nearly four times as likely as the foreign born to marry out. Among Asian women, the native born are only about 50% more likely than the foreign born to marry a non-Asian.


For U.S. born people, outmarriage rates were 41.7% for Asian men, 41.3% for Hispanic men, 37.4% for Hispanic women, and 50.3% for Asian women. For foreign born people, outmarriage rates were 11.7% for Asian men, 11.3% for Hispanic men, 12.2% for Hispanic women, and 36.8% for Asian women.

Mixed race marriage is much more common among the young than the old.

There are strong regional trends. The outmarriage rate for African-Americans in the West is 38% compared to 15.5% nationally and 11.9% in the South. Whites are most likely to outmarry in the West at 15.5%, compared to 8.9% nationally and 5.5% in the Midwest. Hispanics are most likely to outmarry in the Midwest (41.0% v. 25.7% nationally), although Colorado at 35% has a higher outmarriage rate among states with statistically significant numbers of Hispanic outmarriages than any other single state. Asians are most likely to outmarry in the South (36.8% v. 30.8% nationally). Outmarriage for whites is 20% or more in Nevada, New Mexico and California. Black outmarriage rates are 36% in California, the higher percentage in single states with a statistically significant number of black outmarriages, in contrast the lowest percentage of black outmarriages where numbers are statistically significant is found in North Carolina where the percentage is 9%.

These regional trends seem to be driven by a combination of outmarriage being more common when there are more other race and fewer same race options available, and by Hispanics and Asians being more likely to be U.S. born in areas with higher outmarriage rates. Differences in regional attitudes surely do have an effect, but a less intense one than one might expect.

The more education you have, the more likely you are to outmarry.

About 41% of mixed race marriages are Hispanic-white, about 16% are both non-white, about 15% are Asian-white, about 11% of Black-white, and 17% are "other" (which includes Native American, mixed race and "some other race").

In terms of expressed views, far more religious people are uncomfortable with having a child marry an atheist than are uncomfortable with having a child marry something of another race. Whites in 2009 were considerably less likely to have a problem with a child marrying someone of another race than they were in 2001, while blacks were more concerned in 2009 than in 2001 (although still more accepting of mixed race marriages in all time periods with all other races).

Caveats

This observation comes with caveats:

[S]ome sociologists say that grouping all multiracial people together glosses over differences in circumstances between someone who is, say, black and Latino, and someone who is Asian and white. (Among interracial couples, white-Asian pairings tend to be better educated and have higher incomes, according to Reynolds Farley, a professor emeritus at the University of Michigan.)

Along those lines, it is telling that the rates of intermarriage are lowest between blacks and whites, indicative of the enduring economic and social distance between them.


Any study of marriage rates also has to be conscious of the increasing number of parents and intimate couples were are not married. For African-American women, for example, most mothers are not married. The higher rate of interracial marriage for African-American men than for African-American women, for example, could reflect non-African-American women in serious relationships with African-American women placing a greater importance on recognizing that relationship through marriage than African-American women in serious relationships with non-African-American men do.

Analysis

This is a little less than half of what one would see if marriage were entirely random relative to race and ethnicity, although a significant share of the divide between truly random and what is seen is due to neighbor effects (i.e. mixed race marriages tend only happen to the extent that there is someone of another race geographically nearby), rather than actual race or ethnicity based selection of a spouse.

Intermarriage rates are higher for the college educated, despite the fact that the ethnic diversity of college campuses is considerably lower than the ethnic diversity of society as a whole. The gap between the intermarriage percentage that you would expect by random chance if people married others with the same level of education, and what is actually observed, is quite modest among college graduates, but its quite high for high school dropouts.

Asian and Latino intermarriage seems to fit the general profile of immigrant assimilation. Second and later generation immigrants assimilate very fully into their communities linguistically and otherwise, and often outmarry. The future of Asian and Latino marriage patterns may follow that of the "Southern European" identity, which ceased to be very ethnically distinct in the United States in a way that drives marriage patterns. Yet, the WASP v. non-WASP divide, which distinguished people from Catholic and Jewish immigrant populations, from Ireland and Southern Europe in the case of most of the Catholics, and from Eastern Europe in the case of most of the Jews, from non-immigrant American whites, has faded greatly from our ethnic consciousness.

My intuition is that interracial marriage rates for African immigrant populations (e.g. recent immigrants from Ethiopia and Kenya), are probably more similar to Latino and Asian immigrant populations than to African-American populations. For example, immigrant Africans in Denver's public housing projects are much more likely to be married than African-Americans in Denver's public housing projects, and there is probably less discrimination against African immigrants than there is against African-Americans in economic and social contexts.

Razib notes that "The article ignores the elephant in the room: that Americans do not treat African ancestry like they treat Asian (or Amerindian) ancestry. Someone with a black American parent may identify as mixed race, but there is a great deal of social pressure and expectation, such that they are de facto viewed as black." But, I am not so pessimistic.

While African-American outmarriage rates are lower than for U.S. born Hispanics and Asians (a little more than half as much for African-American men, and a quarter as much for African-American women), this has changed dramatically in the last fifty years when it was almost zero, and outmarriage rates have continued to surge in the last twenty years.

Anecdotal evidence that I have encountered, at least, suggests that "one drop" rule notwithstanding, that mixed race children with a black parent and a white parent are indeed a major bridge between the two groups in social settings. A many fold increase in the number of children of black and non-black parents, probably under reported by statistics that only measure actual marriages, means that the bonds between these two ethnic communities in the United States are probably much stronger than they were a generation or two and getting stronger all the time.

Social Class Implications

This elephant in the room is also shrinking as social class divides based on race and ethnicity fades.

The increase in rates of African-American outmarriage closely mirror the growing ranks of the black middle class in the same time period against a background of very low social class mobility in the United States generally..

Despite the fact that almost every statistic you may see on African-American socio-economic success is discouraging, in the big picture in the medium to long term, the story has been one of remarkable socio-economic progress.

Indeed, the rise of the black middle class made possible by the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, and social gains of second generation immigrants, particularly Hispanic immigrants, who have been able to advance further socio-economically than parents who were not native English language speakers and were not assimilated into American culture, explains a great deal of all of the social mobility in the United States in the last forty years. The flip side of this optimistic fact, is that social class mobility is probably considerably lower in the United States for Anglos than the overall figures suggest.

On the other hand, some of the apparently high social class mobility seen in many European nations may be a product of immigrant assimilation patterns seen in the United States, as most of the developed countries of Europe has experienced considerable immigration in recent times. Immigration in the United States in recent years has been typical of the developed world generally.

The seeming immutability of social class boundaries among American whites is remarkable given how fiercely we deny that social class divides exist in American culture (something that our obsession with race has helped make possible), and how irrelevant the distinctions between white ethnics have become in our society.

Perhaps we truly are developing a meritocratic society and perhaps social class divisions based for a couple of generations on real merit are more stable than divisions based on proxies for merit. But, it may also be the case that the weak social welfare system in the United States makes where you start more outcome determinative than it is elsewhere.

New Tribes

Professor Rainier Spencer, who is quoted in the article notes: “The mixed-race identity is not a transcendence of race, it’s a new tribe. A new Balkanization of race.” This may be the case. Definitions of race evolve and have changed in almost every census. The Latin American experience, the French colonial era experience in North America, and the experience in places like Jamaica and South Africa during colonial eras, has been to conceptualize mixed race identities as a "new tribe" or as "new tribes."

If you run mathematical models in which some people in each ethic category have strongly endogenous attitudes and others do not, in a surprisingly small number of generations, almost everyone but those with strongly endogenous tendencies ends up as mixed race, although the smaller a group is, that more quickly this happens.

The fact that more than half of U.S. born children of immigrants still do in marry, and that anecdotal evidence suggests that preferences are similar for third and later generation individuals to those of second generation individuals, suggests that some version of this kind of model makes sense.

My sense in reading political and identity politics rhetoric has been to see a tendency to conceptualize a large "brown" category that includes Hispanics, mixed race people of all types, North Africans, South Asians, Southeast Asians, and Arabs, that has been gaining traction relative to the "People of Color" conception that includes all non-Anglos. The latter is probably easy to measure with linguistic databases like Google's new toy, but the former, because "brown" is used in so many senses, would be harder to measure.

In the same vein, I find it quite interesting that white Southerners in the United States increasingly identify as "American" in ethnicity, while whites outside the South tend to see a connection to some ancestral place of origin in Europe. This is more than a question of style. It has some authentic base in reality and history.

For example, most whites outside the American South practice a religion that has clear historical roots in Europe. Lutherans, Presbyterians, Anglicans, Jews, Orthodox Christians and Catholics, for example, all practice religions with direct European sources and often have religious denominations that remain in communication with parent denominational authorities in West Eurasia. In contrast, the Evangelical Christians of the American South have far more cryptic ties to their European forebears. Colonial era European Baptists, for example, were closer theologically and in liturgical practice to American Quakers and Anabaptists than to the Southern Baptists whose denomination is the predominant white Baptist denomination in the United States. Evangelicals in Latin America, Africa and Asia trace their roots to the United States, not the other way around.

There are multiple narratives of people from the American South touring Europe and discovering just how non-European they are culturally, despite the fact that they look similar physically. An Evangelical Christian white Southerner is more distant culturally and in values from the European norm than a Bostonian Anglican, a Lutheran from Saint Paul, or a white Catholic in Buffalo. The 18th century Scotch-Irish society that those white Southerners who do not identify as "American" identify with barely exists any more outside United Kingdom's territory of Northern Ireland, as the herding and marginal farming economy that sustained that culture has faded away. Politically, the federal election Republicans of the American South (who are overwhelmingly white and whose politics are the overwhelmingly dominant ones of white Southerners) have few parallels in Europe apart from the far right neo-fascist parties.

The American South from the 1700s to the mid-1800s is really one of the better cases in recent history of ethnogenesis. In religion, culture, politics and dialect this cauldron created an ethnicity so distinct from its antecedents that its sources aren't easily traced to a single source anywhere. Few other places in the United States have been more of a melting pot and less of a mixing bowl.

Indeed, the fusion of this new culture and worldview has been so intense that ethnically identified non-Evangelical Christians have been increasingly pressured in reaction to abandon their more specific ethnic ties in favor of a united Pan-American mainline, liturgical Christianity. First, ethnic divisions within major denominational distinctions within Christianity by fusions of ethnically divided denominations of Reformed Christians, Lutherans and Orthodox Christianity, respectively, as these ethic divisions faded in favor of purely denominational ones going back to pre-ethnic division roots. Increasingly, institutions like the National Council of Churches and ecumenical efforts between particular mainline denominations are erasing even that level of division.

Ethnically and culturally, the descendants of Northern, Midwestern and Western white ethnics have been dissolved into an ethnicity that outsiders have described a "Yankee," as inapt as that may be to describing their real roots. How long will it be before whites outside the South start to identify their ancestry as "European" rather than Italian or German or Danish or French or English, in contradistinction to the "American" of Southerners?

Will people who have roots in both Europe and Asia start to identify themselves as "Eurasians," in ancestry, as distinct from Africans or those who self-identify as "Americans"?

I also think that it is possible that we may increasingly start to see a divide in self-identification between African-Americans from the South, and those who are from outside it.

I do think that racial categorization at a social level is basically inescapable. No matter how much the educational establishment and social elite urge us to leave in Martin Luther King, Jr.'s truly color-blind society, I seriously doubt that it will happen, at least not in my lifetime or even that of my grandchildren. But, I do think that the racial and ethnic divisions of the United States will grow increasingly balkanized replacing many categories with the stark black-white dichotomy, and that as we reach a point where there is no majority race or ethnicity in the United States, that those distinctions will become less pernicious.
READ MORE - One in seven marriages is mixed race.

Selasa, 25 Januari 2011

Population Density And Political Identity

The median Republican Congressional district now has a population density 11 times smaller than the median Democratic district[.]


From here.



Chart from here, which goes on to explain:

As shown in the chart above (in Log scale), there was a relatively strong positive correlation between density of congressional districts and the vote share of the Democratic candidate in the 2010 elections. Of densest quartile of districts with a race between a Democrat and a Republican — 105 of them, with a density of 1,935 people per square miles or more — the Democratic candidate won 89. Of the quartile of districts with the lowest densities — 98 people per square mile and below — Democratic candidates only won 23 races.


This is a pretty intense urban-rural divide. Shifts like those in Colorado which transferred rural Congressional Districts 3 and 4 from Blue Dog Democrats to Republicans no doubt made it more intense.

If you wanted to be more fine grained in your analysis, I also have no doubt that intraparty liberal-conservative divides would also show a meaningful connection to population density: moderate Republicans probably tend to be from more urban districts, while conservative Democrats probably tend to be from more rural districts.

I also suspect that further analysis would show that if you were took take more fine grained data, for example, census tracts, that average population density in a district would match the partisan split even more strongly. In other words, it is possible to have a large Congressional district in which most of the voters live in a densely populated central city or two, and a minority of voters live in outlying areas around the cities that house most of the people in the district. My expectation is that geographically large Congressional Districts in which most voters are crammed into central cities but there are large, barely populated outlying areas are more liberal than geographically large Congressional Districts with a steady low level of population densities (e.g. districts that have only small towns, rural areas and exurbs).

There is a credible argument that population density is indeed one of the prime drivers of partisan identity - that living in an urban area causes Democratic policies to make more sense, while living in a rural area causes Republican policies to make more sense.

One way to test that would be to look at changes in political ideology upon moving from an area that has high population density to one that has low population density and visa versa. If an individual's politics get more conservative when he or she moves to the country, and more liberal when he or she moves to the city, then the case for population density causing political identity would be supported (although one could also argue for neighborhood effects that are independent of population density in that scenario).

It is possible to argue for causes other than population density for this divide. For example, one could argue that it is farming, rather than population density that drives it. But, this would fail to explain why exurbanites are more conservative than outer ring suburbanites who in turn are more conservative than inner ring suburbanites who are in turn more conservative than central city residents, none of whom are involved in the farm economy. A population density explanation can also explain why cities like Columbus, Ohio, which have a large land area for their population, are more conservative politically than more densely populated cities like Denver.

One important caveat is that I am not at all sure that this relationship holds in all U.S. regions. In the South, partisan divides based on race and religion may swamp most population density effects, while in the North, I suspect that racial and religious divides merely reinforce the population density effects. There are many rural blacks in the South and few in the North.
READ MORE - Population Density And Political Identity

Jumat, 21 Januari 2011

Twenty Obvious International Trends

Lots of economic, environmental and political predictions are hardly better than horoscopes. Others are reliable enough to be thought of a "fundamentals." I'm more interested in the latter. Here are a few:

1. China's economic growth rate will be greater for medium term time periods (e.g. three years or more) than that of the United States for the foreseeable future, because it is engaged in "catch up growth," while the United States is not.

2. China will experience a notable economic crash in the next decade or so, because it hasn't had one for a long time and periods of even strong sustained growth are almost always interrupted periodically by economic crashes.

3. India's economic growth rate will be greater for medium term time periods than that of the United States for the foreseeable future, because it is engaged in "catch up growth," while the United States is not.

4. India's economic growth rate will exceed that of China sometime in the next ten to fifteen years, because China's per capita GDP is significantly greater than that of India, leaving India with more "catch up growth" potential than China.

5. Oil dependent nations in the Middle East will each experience serious economic contractions not long as oil production in the nation in question starts to fall due to exhaustion of the nation's oil supply. These nations are heavily reliant on oil revenues to sustain their standard of living with imported goods and temporary immigrant workers, both of which will be harder to come by when there are not new oil revenues available.

6. Countries in Africa that experience war and authoritarian governments will experience less economic growth than those with sustained periods of peace and democratic government.

7. In the developing world, it will be a long time before environmental and climate change concerns have enough political clout to cause air pollution to be reduced more rapidly than the increasing scope of economic activity increases air pollution. As a result, emissions will not be reduced rapidly enough to stop continued global warming.

8. Nuclear power will spread to more countries.

9. Oil more be more expensive in real terms in 2020 and more expensive again in real terms in 2030 than it is today. Rising oil prices will make technologies that are powered by energy sources other than oil more attractive. This trend will be a global one, because oil trades in a global marketplace.

10. Oil rich countries that are not close to exhausting their reserves will receive an economic boost from rising oil prices.

11. North Korea's political and economic system will collapse, probably within a couple of decades, if it fails to open itself up to the rest of the world. If it does collapse, it will probably be reabsorbed by South Korea.

12. Public health measures will improve in most of the developing and undeveloped world that are not war torn as patents on new effective drugs expire and make those drugs more affordable.

13. Global fertility rates will fall as more countries become more economically developed.

14. Developing countries will become less religious as they become more economically developed in fairly close synch with falling fertility rates.

15. The need to impose taxes as oil revenues decline will force Middle Eastern monarchs who have not already been deposed in revolutions and democratized of their own free will to make genuine democratic reforms.

16. The proportion of the world population engaged in farming will fall steadily for decades to come.

17. Some small island nations will be swallowed up by the sea and forced to relocate all or most of their populations as sea levels rise with global warming sometime in the next century.

18. A large share of the world's languages, probably half or more, will die in the next few decades.

19. A significant number of plant and animal species will go extinct in the next few decades.

20. The proportion of Africans who are Christians will increase significantly over the next decade.
READ MORE - Twenty Obvious International Trends

Kamis, 13 Januari 2011

The Grandparent Revolution Happened Late

The ratio of old adults to young adults in Neandertals was similar to that of early modern humans in the Levant and early Upper Paleolithic people of Europe, according to a new study that largely confirms a group of papers published from 2004 to 2006 by a separate team of researchers.

According to the New York Times, the new study found that:

[T]here was approximately the same number of adults in the 20-to-40 age range and over-40 age range in both groups. About 25 percent of adult humans and Neanderthals survived past 40.


Infant mortality rates, the proportion of the population that was made up of juveniles, and the fraction of juveniles who survived to become adults is not estimated.

If the number of juveniles at any given time was roughly equal to the number of adults (which is a rough estimate of what one would expect after an initial expansion of a founder population to a stable level), then this would imply a life expectency for children who escaped infant morality on the order of twenty years. This is on the order of half that of the least developed countries today, and probably somewhat below life expectencies in the Roman Empire. Infant mortality then was probably in the 15% to 35% range seen in the the least modern circumstances for which there is good documentation.

Even with infant mortality on the high end of this range, significant child birth mortality of women, and a fair amount of birth order spacing as is found in modern hunter-gatherer societies, one would expect the average woman to have about six children in a lifetime (the highest numbers of children per woman in agricultural world societies today is about eight), two of whom, on average, would die as infants, and only half of the remaining four of which would survive to have children of their own in a stable population. Thus, about two-thirds of children born would live the first year, about one-third of children born would live to age twenty. Life expectency at birth would be something on the order of twelve years.

It is also worth noting for context, that in the hunter-gatherer era, except for a few highly productive fishing societies like those of the Pacific Northwest and Japan, that until farming was invented, "Individual band societies tend to be small in number (10-30 individuals), but these may gather together seasonally to temporarily form a larger group (100 or more) when resources are abundant."

Thus, in a seasonal gathering of half a dozen bands with an average of twenty people each, there might have been 60 kids, 45 adults who were not yet middle aged, and 15 adults who were middle aged or elderly, of whom probably no more than 5 adults would be older than the sixty-five year old age we think of as retirement aged in modern life. One or two bands out of half a dozen would have had no elderly adults, while probably none of the bands would have had more than a couple of elderly adults. If the pre-modern populations that I am most familiar with are any indication, child birth mortality would probably have caused an excess of men over women in among the elders. So, there might only be one or two women among the elderly in the larger tribe.

According to John Hawks, whose post is the first link above, the newer study, however, "found fewer [modern human] older adults in the early Upper Paleolithic."

Hawks engaged the authors of the new study on their decision not to cite the earlier study, but apart from issues of academic etiquette, the result enhances confidence in the conclusion because replication of results is key part of the scientific process.

The research (and their one difference in result) matters because one of the notable hypotheses that has been used to explain the great success of modern humans as a species has been the observation that having a significant number of grandparents in the population may have provided selective advantages for the community as a whole, perhaps, for example, by making it easier for cultural practices and community oral histories to be preserved more accurately for longer periods of time.

If the new study is closer to the truth than the older one, or even if the truth is somewhere in between them, the grandparent hypothesis is not disproven, but it then follows that the grandparent advantage, rather than being a feature of modern humans that gave them a strong edge relative to Neanderthals and other archaic hominins. Instead, this may have been something that arose in most places (the Jomon in Japan whose fishing society was the first to make pottery may have been an earlier exception) sometime after the Last Glacial Maximum of about 20,000 years ago. Thus, it may have arise after a period of something on the order of 200,000 years during which anatomically modern humans existed and had characteristically modern human tool sets, which included, for example, more sophisticated stone work and the use of bone in tools not utilized by other archaic hominins.
READ MORE - The Grandparent Revolution Happened Late

Rabu, 05 Januari 2011

On Fitness, Advanced Parental Age and Selection

Advanced parental age, i.e. having an older father, is a risk factor for a wide variety of genetic diseases (e.g. schizophrenia and autism). Advanced maternal age is generally not. In part, this is because older women lose fertility. In part, this is because a woman's eggs are created when she is young, even if they are not available for fertilization until much later, while a man's sperm are created on a regular basis, and so bear the environmental and aging impacts that his body experiences, a mutation risk load that mounts as he gets older.

While it isn't absolutely conclusively, the evidence very strongly points to mutations in sperm cells as the predominant cause of advanced paternal age related conditions, which makes a great deal of sense, simply because there aren't many other mechanisms by which advanced paternal age could cause diseases with a strong hereditary component. The only additional possible source is closely related - epigenetic impacts acquired by a father during life or at birth that are passed on to a child.

Having an older father is not an entirely bad thing, however, from an evolutionary genetics perspective. An older father, by definition, was fit enough to have live to be reasonably old, and to be fertile enough and able to successfully secure a mother for his child at that age. Evolutionarily speaking, older fathers should, by definition, generally be more fit than the average father, and certainly should be more fit than the average man who is born without regard to whether or not he has children.

There is anecdotal ethnographic evidence that older fathers also tend to have greater success in securing more fit than average mothers for their children. Men who married well the first time may have prospered in part because they had better than average wives. Widowers have often been considered prize catches, at least by parents arranging marriages, and most marriages were arranged from at least the Neolithic era until the last couple of centuries. If children of older fathers also tend to have more fit mothers on average (presumably because their fathers are more fit themselves), then the children receive a double fitness benefit in their genetic inheritance, and the maternal half of that benefit does not carry any elevated mutational risks. Certainly, anyway, there is little evidence that the children of older fathers tend to have less fit than average mothers.

Thus, while children of fathers of advanced paternal age are at greater than average risk of novel, harmful mutations (harmful here meaning evolutionary selective fitness disadvantage), their paternal genetic inheritance will generally be one associated with above average fitness. And, since many novel, harmful mutations lead to miscarriages or congenital defects, children of fathers of advanced paternal age who survive past infancy are not bearing the full cost of the additional mutational risk associated with their father's advanced age. In a more harsh age, marginally fit young children might also have received less than full parental support as resources were devoted instead to more fit siblings - infanticide was common place for much of human history, and only in modern times has it become the norm for all of one's children to survive to adulthood.

Even those children of fathers of advanced parental age who do end up having novel and harmful (but non-deadly) mutations will take a general background of above average fitness in their genetic inheritance together with the novel, harmful mutations. Often, the good will be better than the bad, and as a generally rule there will be both fitness enhancing and fitness reducing genetic traits in the child who also had novel, harmful mutations. Novel fitness enhancing mutations are also probably more likely in children of fathers of advanced paternal age, although the literature seems to suggest that fitness reducing mutations are far more common than fitness enhancing mutations. (Many, if not most, mutations neither enhance nor harm evolutionary fitness.)

Of course, the other disadvantage faced by children of fathers of advanced paternal age is an increased likelihood of being without a father or paternal grandparents when one is relatively young, and if fathers and paternal grandparents enhance one's fitness, in the evolutionary selection sense, then that is another strike against them. There is a school of human evolutionary thought that attributes great selective advantage to the extension of life expectancy long enough that the society has a reasonable number of grandparents alive at any given time, based on circumstantial evidence related to life expectancy and population sizes, but it isn't obvious that the benefits of having elders in a community are primarily a benefit to their own grandchildren, or are a benefit to the community generally, for example, by providing it with continuity of knowledge and culture.

Now, the babies of the brood of an older father are still at a disadvantage relative to their older siblings who may have all of their father's genetic fitness, because they will have none of the novel, harmful mutations associated with a father of advanced paternal age, and because they will have received the benefits of having a living father, and perhaps living grandparents, for a larger share of their life. The only real advantage that the babies of the brood have are the possibility that their mother is a subsequent more fit spouse than their older siblings, and the possibility that the parents improved their parenting skills over time after making mistakes the first times around. The babies may also compensate for possibly less paternal parenting with more older sibling support.

The source of fitness for an older father may be different now than it was in pre-modern times.

In pre-modern times, the main genetic windfall one might receive from an older father might have been the good health related traits that allowed him to live until forty years of age or older, while a significant share of his peers died by then, or become infertile by then, or ceased to be able to attract any women to be mothers for their children at that point.

In modern times, in contrast, postponing fatherhood is usually closely associated with having obtained an advanced education before marrying, and having developed a career and obtaining socio-economic success. Simply living to be that old and being able to be fertile enough with reproductive medicine to have children at an advanced age is now common place and has only trivial fitness implications, but attracting a fertile woman to be a mother for your children, and having a reason to defer childbearing is a pursuit that strongly favors traits that favor socio-economic success. Also, the likelihood of an older father dying before a child comes of age is now greatly reduced from pre-modern times, and marriages entered into when a father is more mature and economically successful tend to be more stable (although there are certainly a significant number of serial divocees who have children in each new marriage among older fathers). Older fathers are likely to have more children overall as well, possible forcing each child to receive a smaller share of inherited wealth, although it isn't obvious that property inheritance at death is a very important factor in life success these days.

Another significant subset of men who are more likely than average to be older fathers are men who seek to have as many children as possible for religious reasons. Razib at Gene Expression has made some notable posts exploring the demographic impacts of this trend in affluent societies. Basically, in poor societies, almost everyone is religious and almost everyone has as many children as they can in the hope that some will survive. With economic development, the vast majority of people become less religious and reduce their childbearing rates to replacement levels in short order in order to maximize the economic resources that they can devote to each child because they can have faith that the child will live to be an adult and have children of his or her own. But, a minority of people in developed societies make a conscious, usually religiously motivated choice to have as many children as they can anyway, and that choice has a major impact of the demographics of developed societies (which universally are not willing to let children in big families start and die due to a shortfall of resources, although China did take a very punitive stance to discourage the large family option as it developed with its one child policy for urban families). These demographic trends also have population genetic implications. From an evolutionary fitness perspective having as many kids as you possibly can even in an economically developed modern society is a great choice for you and your co-religionists (although it may be bad for society as a whole), so from an evolutionary selection perspective, an older father who religiously believes in having many children and passed that cultural trait on to his children has caused them to be much more evolutionarily fit.

Also, of course, most children of older fathers don't have any novel harmful mutations. They get their parents above average fitness while bearing not of the hardships associated with having a father of advanced paternal age (except that a sibling may have such issues and that may stress family resources, but that is rarely a deal breaker in modern societies, and was often resolved by the premature death of the unfit sibling in pre-modern societies). This means that the new child enhances the father's evolutionary fitness, on average, making the ex ante decision to have more children an easy one from a selection perspective, and leave the child fit as well.

All of this is very general, but it may also help to provide a general explanation of why genetic mutations associated with advanced paternal age (even in subsequent generations for children whose parents are young), may tend to receive counterbalancing selective advantages that have no direct causal relationship to any novel, harmful mutations that they may have received because they are descendant from a father of advanced parental age.

Indeed, some of the upsides associated with conditions associated with advanced paternal age such as creativity or logical aptitude or enhanced courtship traits, may be products of having more fit than average patriline ancestors rather than of something flowing from the advanced paternal age condition itself. If so, one would expect the upside associated with advanced paternal age conditions to present more strongly in first generation people with those conditions than in subsequent generations where a fit paternal genetic inheritance that came with the novel harmful mutations has been diluted.

As a footnote, with the genetic risk associated with having inbred children is largely avoidable by someone interested in having children, simply by choosing an unrelated mate, which is something that if often possible in modern societies, once you are an older father, you can't undo the decisions to have or not have children that you made earlier in life. Those are sunk costs and the only decision that a prospective older father has to make is to have or not have children. There is no easy mutation risk reducing option at that point. This also makes it an easier choice and helps explain why of two parenting choices that present similar genetic condition risk to offspring, one is usually prohibited legally and discouraged socially, while the other is rarely prohibited legally.
READ MORE - On Fitness, Advanced Parental Age and Selection

Rabu, 22 Desember 2010

Teen Births at Record Lows In U.S.

The birth rate for [U.S.] teenagers fell to 39 births per 1,000 girls ages 15-19. . . . It was a 6 percent decline from the previous year and the lowest since health officials started tracking the rate in 1940. . . . The total number of births also has been dropping, as have birth rates among all women except those 40 and older.

For comparison, look to the peak year of teen births — 1957. There were about 96 births per 1,000 teen girls that year, but it was a different era, when women married younger . . . Overall, about 4.1 million babies were born in 2009, down almost 3 percent from 2008.

It's the second consecutive drop in births, which had been on the rise since 2000. . . . A preliminary count of U.S. births through the first six months of this year suggests a continuing drop.


From here citing data from the Center for Disease Control (a federal government agency).

Colorado's teen birth rate followed national trends in declining, and is about 9% less than the national average.

In Colorado, 24.9% of all births are to unmarried mothers, compared to 41.0% of all births nationally. Utah is the only state in the United States with a lower proportion of births to ummarried mothers (19.4%). In, Idaho, which like Utah and unlike Colorado, has a prevasive Mormon cultural influence, 25.6% of births are to unmarried mothers (the lowest in the United States after Utah and Colorado). There is no obvious reason that Colorado is such an outlier in this regard, but this number is consistent from 2008 to 2009. Unlike Utah and Idaho where first marriage ages are far lower than the rest of the nation, Colorado is not particularly atypical in its average ages at first marriage and Colorado is far more ethnically diverse than many states with higher rates of unmarried motherhood. This number is so unexpected that I am suspicious that it might be a mistake, as it does not seem to be a good fit to unmarried motherhood rates in Denver, although Colorado's retention of the institution of common law marriage could also be factor and births in Denver are almost certainly atypical of the state as a whole.

According to the CDC report: "The [birth] rate for the youngest teenagers, 10-14 years, fell from 0.6 to 0.5 per 1,000, the lowest level ever reported. . . . The birth rate for teenagers 15-17 years declined 7 percent to 20.1 per 1,000. This rate dropped 9 percent from 2007 (22.1) to 2009, and was 48 percent lower than the rate reported in 1991 (38.6 per 1,000)."

Teen births are down 59% from their 1957 modern peak, about 33% from their most recent peak in the late 1980s (when I was 15-19 years old), and significantly below the depressed levels of World War II which rebounded from a long period of muted fertility with the baby boom. With the exception of a surge in teen birth rates in the late 1980s and some small, short term statistical blips, teen birth rates have declined steadily from the 1957 peak of the baby boom to the present.

While accurate national teen birth rate statistics go back only to 1940, it is unlikely that there is any time in the history of the United States when teen birth rates have been as low as they are now, because women tended to marry younger, have children immediately upon getting married, end their formal educations sooner, had higher birth rates in generally (in part because fewer children were likely to survive to adulthood), and contraception and abortion were both far less available then. Ages at first marriage are currently at or near near record highs.

We care about teen birth rates as a social indicator, of course, mostly because teen pregnancy creates an acute risk of poverty and reduced socio-economic expectations for both the mother and the children, and because, particularly for the youngest mothers, it is often an indicator of coerced sexual relationships, usually outside marriage or in forced marriages. Low teen birth rates are expected to translate into lower long term poverty rates.

I haven't seen the parallel abortion statistics for 2009 yet, but if the trend of births and abortions the last couple of decades is any indication, the decline in births generally, and in teen births in particular, is almost entirely due to fewer pregnancies, rather than due to a smaller share of pregnancies ending in live births. Abortion rates have fallen at least as fast as teen birth rates.

Births to married mothers fell faster than births to unmarried mothers in 2009, so the share of all births to unmarried mothers rose, reaching 41.0% in 2009.

The 2009 trends were widespread amongst almost all age and ethnic categories, but the actual teen birth rates differed greatly by ethnicity.

The birth rate per 1,000 girls aged 10 to 14 in 2009 by ethnicity was:
Asian or Pacific Islander 0.2
Non-Hispanic White 0.2
American Indian or Native American 0.8
Non-Hispanic Black 1.2
Hispanic 1.0

The birth rate per 1,000 women aged 15 to 17 in 2009 by ethnicity was:
Asian or Pacific Islander 7.1
Non-Hispanic White 11.0
American Indian or Native American 30.6
Non-Hispanic Black 32.6
Hispanic 41.0

The birth rate per 1,000 women aged 18 to 19 in 2009 by ethnicity was:
Asian or Pacific Islander 25.7
Non-Hispanic White 46.1
American Indian or Native American 90.5
Non-Hispanic Black 97.5
Hispanic 114.0

The recession, a weak job market, and declining immigrant populations have been cited as possible factors in the declining birth dates.

The "total fertility rate" in the United States has been below the "replacement rate" at which births match deaths as it has in every year from 1972 to 2009 except 2006 and 2007.

This year's data continues to support the very recent trend (i.e. of the last decade or so), in which poverty has tended to reduce, rather than increase fertility. It is safe to assume that in the one group of women in whom birth rates have risen, women 40 and over, that this is driven almost entirely by affluent women who are getting pregnant with the help of fertility treatments.

To the extent that lower teen birth rates, and indeed lower birth rates generally, are an indicator of a weaker economy, 2010 may very well be the year with the lowest teen birth rate for a very long time, as teen birth rates in the U.S. may rise modestly when the economy recovers, although the fact that teen birth rates remain higher in the U.S. than in much of the rest of the developed world leaves open the possibility that there is more room for a secular decline in teen birth rates in the United States.
READ MORE - Teen Births at Record Lows In U.S.

Census Shifts Power To Mountain West and South

The final 2010 census figures (giving the United States a 2010 population overall of 308.7 million people) have shifted eleven seats in Congress from the Northeast and Midwest to the Mountain West and the South. All nine states in the Northeast and Midwest whose allotment of Congressional seats changed saw that allotment decline. In the West and South, eight states increased the size of their Congressional delegations, while Louisiana, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, lost one seat in Congress. Colorado's Congressional delegation, as expected, stayed constant at seven seats in the House of Representatives.

Advantage GOP

The shift relative to the 2000 apportionment favors Republicans in both the House of Representatives and the electoral college used to elect the President.

Of the states that will get greater representation in the 2012 election, five states that gains eight seats in Congress are red states that voted for McCain in 2008 and Bush in 2004, two states that gained three seats in Congress voted for Obama in 2008 but Bush in 2004, and one state that gained one seat in Congress is a blue state that voted for Obama in 2008 and Kerry in 2004.

Of the states that will lose seats in Congress in the 2012 election, six states that lost seven seats in Congress are blue states that voted for Obama in 2008 and Kerry in 2004, two states that lost three seat in Congress voted for Obama in 2008 but Bush in 2004, and two states that lost two seats in Congress are red states that voted for McCain in 2008 and Bush in 2004.

Thus, red states have gained a net six seats in Congress, blue states have lost a net six seats in Congress, and states that voted for Obama in 2008 and Bush in 2004 have the same number of net seats in Congress.

While the strong growth of Democratic party leaning demographic groups like minorities and younger voters, and the increasing secularization of the American public tends to favor the Democrats, the low levels of voter registration and diffuse nature of the growing demographics that favor Democrats growth have prevented the intra-electorate trends from being important as the geographic shifts in population in influencing the balance of political power in the United States.

Long Term Trends

The shift continues and reflects trends over the last forty years largely associated with a shift of the American economy from an industrial one to a post-industrial one (a bland description that reflect the fact that even the best informed observers lack a simple heuristic explanation of what our economy is based upon these days), and secondarily a shift from rural areas to urban ones.

Since 1970, states have gained or lost representatives in Congress as follows (with the parenthetical number indicating the number of Congressional seats in the 2012 election):

South (+27)
Texas +12 (36)
Florida +12 (27)
Georgia +4 (14)
North Carolina +2 (13)
South Carolina +1 (7)
Tennessee +1 (9)
Virginia +1 (11)

No change: Maryland (8), Alabama (7), Arkansas (4), Delaware (1)

Kentucky -1 (6)
Oklahoma -1 (5)
Mississippi -1 (4)
West Virginia -1 (3)
Louisiana -2 (6)

Mountain West and Pacific (+26)
California +10 (53)
Arizona +5 (9)
Nevada +3 (4)
Washington +3 (10)
Utah +2 (4)
Colorado +2 (7)
New Mexico +1 (3)
Oregon +1 (5)

No change: Hawaii (2), Idaho (2), Alaska (1), Wyoming (1)

Montana -1 (1)

Midwest and Great Plains (-27)
Ohio -7 (16)
Illinois -6 (18)
Michigan -5 (14)
Iowa -2 (4)
Missouri -2 (8)
Indiana -2 (9)
South Dakota -1 (1)
Kansas -1 (4)
Wisconsin -1 (8)

No change: Minnesota (8), Nebraska (3), North Dakota (1)

Northeast (-26)
New York -12 (27)
Pennsylvania -7 (18)
Massachusetts -3 (9)
New Jersey -3 (12)
Connecticut -1 (5)

No change: Maine (2), New Hampshire (2), Rhode Island (2), Vermont (1)

Reapportionment's Interaction With Realignment

The shift of political power to the South and Mountain West has coincided with a period in which conservative Democrats in Congress, mostly in the South, have been replaced by Republicans, and moderate Republicans in Congress, mostly in the Northeast and Pacific States, have been replaced by Democrats in Congress.

In the Republican party, the trends reinforce each other, by shifting the central of gravity of the Republican party further towards white Southern Evangelical Christians and Mormons. The electoral importance of "Reagan Democrat" blue collar union members and farmers to the Republican coalition has been reduced, and fossil fuel extraction interests have taken at least as many hits as they have made gains.

The realignment together with demographic trends tend to favor a shift to the right in the Republican party on social issues, but may undermine the strength of big money financial interests, the so called Rockefeller Republicans who live in coastal areas where Democrats are dominant in politics and a cosmopolitan identity is necessary to do business, in the Republican party. It may also undermine the ability of Republicans to draw support in any part of the mainstream entertainment industry that provided it with notable leaders like Ronald Reagan and Arnold Schwarzenegger. There will be pressure for economic conservatives outside socially conservative Republican strongholds and young conservatives to dissociate themselves from the Republican party's red state strongholds if they have any desire to remain relevant in state and local politics, a tendency that the electoral success of the Tea Party movement which publicly focused on economic rather than social issues, despite having a very culturally conservative composition, may encourage.

In the Democratic party, the demographic trends weaken the importance of blue collar private sector labor unions in the coalition, while increasing the relative importance of ethnic minorities including Hispanics, African Americans, and Asian Americans in the Democratic coalition. It reduces the electoral contribution of Jews to the Democratic party coalition (as gains in Florida are outweighed by losses in the Northeast), while increasing the importance of snowbird seniors who have relocated to warmer climes from blue states.

Large minority populations in growing red states mean that Republicans there will continue to need to be the near consensus party of Anglos in the South to win elections there. Outside the South, non-Hispanic whites are deeply split between the two major political parties, although the GOP has an edge with them.

The Republicans seem more unified politically at the moment, than the Democrats. But, the strongly geographic dimension of the divide between the Republican party's Christian right and its economic conservatives, and the large differences in political strategy between the "tribal" politics of Anglo ethnic identity in the South and the political strategy of issue driven intra-ethnic political contests elsewhere may ironically leave the GOP with more potential for schism into two different parties of the right, one dominant in each respective part of the country.

In contrast, the current big tent of the Democrats (which has shrunk somewhat by the defeat of many Blue Dogs), leaves the Democratic party seemingly more ideologically diffuse at the moment, the various factions within the Democratic party can't be decomposed nearly so easily on a regional basis. Democrats are more divided on tactics than they are on their political goals.

The American single member district plurality system can support more than two parties, so long as they are regional parties and there are no more than two strong political parties in any given area. But, the American electoral system strongly disfavors political party schism for geographically diffuse factions within a political party, even if that faction is substantial and ideologically coherent.

Third parties like the Green Party or the Libertarians are doomed in the absence of proportional representation elections. But, our system could support, for example, both a "21st century Whig Party" as a leading party of the right outside the South and areas of Mormon or Evangelical Christian religious dominance, centered on the economic establishment, and a "Christian Republican Party" that was strongly socially conservative but might have a more populist economic agenda than the existing Republican party, as a leading party of the right in current Republican strongholds.
READ MORE - Census Shifts Power To Mountain West and South

Rabu, 15 Desember 2010

Demographic Change Documented

The people in my grandchildren's world won't look like those in my grandparent's world.

About 48 percent of newborns last year were members of minority groups, compared with just a fifth of those over 65. . . . More than a third of all 13.3 million new suburbanites were Latino, compared with 2.5 million blacks and 2 million Asians. In all, whites accounted for a fifth of suburban growth.

Even in rural America, where the population grew the slowest — just 2 percent since 2000 compared with 7 percent nationwide — foreign-born residents accounted for 37 percent of that growth. Three-quarters of them were not citizens[.]


The up and coming populations of the United States aren't well treated. The poor are disproportionately children and poverty is no longer largely a phenomena of central cities.
READ MORE - Demographic Change Documented

Jumat, 10 Desember 2010

The Economics of Place

Suppose that the 300 million people who live in the United States were all bunched together at the population density of Brooklyn. And for those not familiar with it, Brooklyn is certainly not the most densely populated part of New York City (that would be Manhattan). Denver's Capital Hill neighborhood, for example, is more densely populated than Brooklyn. So, how much space would it take to fit the population of the United States in one place at Brooklyn's population density?

Answer: About the land area of New Hampshire "with extra room for parks (because Brooklyn could use more)."

Of course, not all activities necessary for the survival of the United States economy and civilization can function at that population density. A big chunk of the United States is farmland and the 2%-3% of the population in the farm economy would have to be spread out to tend those farms. Likewise, another 1%-2% or so of the population is engaged in harvesting lumber, fishing, and mining, which likewise have to be undertaken where the resources are located.

Even these intensely location dependent industries continue to grow less labor intensive. Less than half of all farms produce a very large share of all agricultural output in the United States. Shrinking wild fish resources mean that in the future there will be fewer fishermen. Recycling has muted the demand for newly mined metals. An increasingly paperless world needs less pulpwood than it used to require. Energy efficient technologies have reduced the amount of energy consumed in the course of making each $1,000 of GDP.

But, for the most part, location is a matter of choice. Historically, for example, car factories and other heavy industry in the United States was located in Rust Belt in cities like Detroit, Flint, Toledo, Cleveland, Buffalo and Pittsburg. But, there's nothing sacred about that today given the much reduced cost of transportation. A new automobile assembly plant was recently built in Mississippi, and the old guard of internal combustion engine automobile makers recently handed over an automobile assembly plant in California to a new guard company set on making electric cars. Some of the cars you see on the street were made in Japan (which is famous for its utter dearth of natural resources) and Germany, both of which are half a world away, even though a car is one of the heaviest goods (and hence most expensive to transport) that the average person owns other than a home. Vehicles are made in North American both in Mexico, just across the border from El Paso, Texas, and in Ontario, just across the border from Buffalo and Detroit. Manufacturing enterprises have immense freedom to locate pretty much anywhere they want, subject to very modest constraints.

Most of the economy, retail trade, hotels, branch commercial banking, gas stations, post offices, schools, hospitals, construction, government, and so on, needs to be located conveniently to the people who buy the goods and services they offer but aren't intrinsically connected to any particular place. There is very little that is done in Denver that couldn't be done just as functionally in Fort Collins or Colorado Springs had the path of history taken a slightly different step.

We also have quite a few industries where geography is absolutely critical, but it is critical because the industries operate in national or international marketplaces where proximity to industry colleagues is critical. New York is the center of the American investment banking industry because it started there and never left, and because there is considerably value in that industry in being able to have face to face meetings with other members of the investment banking community on short notice, not because the intrinsic geographic benefits of New York, like its status as a port city, have any continuing relevance to what the financial industry does there these days. The same is true for some of New York City's other major industries like television, publishing, and live theater. These industries are prominent simply because they thrive on large local markets and intra-industry interactions, and the New York City metropolitan area is one of the largest local markets in the country with the most established publishing houses and theater scenes. It is helpful to have key parts suppliers for a company near the company that makes the final product, particularly if the parts are physically large, the demand for them fluctuates unpredictably, and it may be necessary to make adjustments to return or modify parts that don't quite fit.

Indeed, industry inertia frequently trumps considerations of geography that would seem to be important. Lots of movies set in the United States are filmed in Prague or Toronto, for example. A majority of publicly held companies in the United States are incorporated in a suburb of Philadelphia called the state of Delaware that doesn't have any notable skyscrapers of its own (the pyramid of Giza built by the ancient Egyptians was 451 feet tall, while the tallest building in the state, the Chase Wilmington Building, is 330 feet tall), lacks an Ivy League college or a prestigious law school, is the only state in the United States without commercial air service, and closes its bars at 1 a.m. The state doesn't even have a single major league professional sports team of its own.

Even industries you might think of as highly location dependent, like tourism, aren't quite as bound to a particular place as you might think. Las Vegas could have been built anywhere within a moderate drive from a major population center. Disneyland and Disney World are likewise not to tightly tied to the world beyond their walls, a fact evidenced by the fact that new ones have sprung up across the world.

If a Nor'easter did to New York City what Hurricane Katrina did to New Orleans, with a similar amount of lead time to allow most people to evacuate, and the Mayor of New York City convinced everyone to move to Fargo at some critical moment, the city that never sleeps could be rebuilt in the Great Plains and continue on a more or less business as usual basis. Something is lost in translation at first, as we observe in cases where national capitals are relocated to completely planned cities like Canberra, Australia and Brasilia, Brazil. Washington D.C. was established on that kind of basis as well, but has aged enough into a character of its own that we tend to forget that fact.

The disconnect between economic activity and location is relatively new. In the 1920s, for example, close proximity to natural resources, consumers, water routes and rail lines was much more important for manufacturing firms. Until World War II, a much larger share of the population lived on farms.

Telecommunications have gotten cheap even more recently. I used to spend a large share of my monthly budget on long distance phone charges so that I could talk with the woman I would later marry when I was in law school, while she was half way across the country going to school somewhere else. These days, there is usually no extra charge for long distance calls relative to local ones. The postal service is coughing up red ink because information can be sent for a near zero marginal cost over the Internet and so people don't send letters nearly as often.

It isn't that location is irrelevant. But, today, what matters is "who lives there?" and "how nice of a place is it to live?" Not, "what is there?"
READ MORE - The Economics of Place