Cause Of Death: Misprocessing of Medicaid Benefits

Nine year Zumante Lucero, pictured above, had asthma that he could treat with a drug called Advair that he has a prescription for and was entitled to as part of the Medicaid benefits for which he was eligible.

The Denver County Department of Human Services was in charge of handling his application and despite strenuous efforts by his mother to get the county to tell Walgreens that he was eligible to have the medicine, they instead incorrectly told Walgreens that he wasn't even though they had told Zumate's mother (correctly) that Zumante was eligible to have Medicaid pay for his medicines. Zumante couldn't afford the drugs over the several months that Denver's computer system told Walgreens that Zumante didn't have coverage when he actually did, despite Zumante's mother's efforts, and as a result, Zumante's asthma killed him in July of 2009.

"The city fixed Zumante's eligibility status to pay for his funeral." Swell job guys.

The State of Colorado has faced litigation for years over this computer system which it requires counties to use (if I recall correctly, this problem dates back to Governor Owens and neither Governor Ritter nor Governor Hickenlooper have yet been able to solve it), but the Medicaid benefits processing system that was purchased for millions of dollars by the State from a big name private contractor didn't work and never has worked. Judges have ordered the State to take action, but it didn't fix the problem, either by fixing the computer or by finding a work around that worked. This was something that was entirely foreseeable and had been predicted for years before it happened.

Zumante died as much because certain named bureaucrats (and no doubt other unnamed bureaucrats and government computer contractors) screwed up and denied him a few hundred bucks worth of medicine that the law said he was entitled to have and that the Denver County Department of Human Services knew he was entitled to have but didn't extent themselves to clear up despite the life threatening nature of this boy's conditions in the absence of his medicine.

I'm not even going to begin to think about the legal issues involved. Suffice it to say that the when some judge writes an opinion resolving this case a long time from now, if the case is not settled, that the statement of facts will less than a page long and the analysis of the procedural history and the law will be lengthy. Governmental liability in tort is an arcane subject at the best of times in the simplest of cases.

But there is no good reason that kids should be dying in Denver, Colorado when we have the drugs to treat it, the means to pay for the treatment, the legislative will to provide coverage, and an involved parent trying to obtain care by contacting the government officials and pharmacists in charge of making it happen. Moreover, any department whose bureaucratic screw ups can be a matter of life and death that serves people who are, by definition, poor and in practice, almost always not the most sophisticated in cutting through red tape, rarely politically connected and rarely able to afford lawyers, needs to have someone out there with the power and ability to fix problems promptly who is looking out for the program's beneficiaries.

This is not a program where it is reasonable to assume that the beneficiaries or those acting on their behalf will be able to navigate the system and correct governmental screw ups on their own.

READ MORE - Cause Of Death: Misprocessing of Medicaid Benefits

Lithuania Has Paramilitary Parking Enforcement

If you think that the Denver Boot is the cutting edge in tough on crime parking enforcement, you've obviously not been to Vilnius, Lithuania lately, where the mayor has taken to running over illegally parked cars with an armored personnel carrier.

Obvious, this is a highly wasteful and destructive approach to parking enforcement.  In contrast, here in Denver our last Mayor made a name for himself with merciful random act of kindness meter feeding to thwart parking enforcement, rather than paramilitary tactics, and the city council recently voted to relax a citizen adopted car impoundment ordinance.

But, when in Vilnius, stay out of the bike lane.

(It's actually a hoax, and is really is an add for a Swedish radio show, which makes it merely a safely entertaining pipe dream.)

READ MORE - Lithuania Has Paramilitary Parking Enforcement

Fiscal Choices of Evils

Dorf echoes my previous post on the subject, and that of other legal pundits, in analyzing a failure to increase the debt limit as a choice of evils for the President and then observing that while every option is unconstitutional that some options (like imposing taxes unilaterally) may be more unconstitutional than others (like ignoring the debt ceiling).

the President's menu of options looks very interesting. There's no way he can comply with all three laws: 1) Taxing to raise revenue X; 2) Borrowing to raise Y; 3) Spending in the amount of Z > X+Y. (I'm assuming that other means of raising revenue, such as selling Alaska back to Russia, or invading Saudi Arabia and selling its oil to China, have been rejected as preposterous.) So:

1) Taxing beyond X would amount to an unconstitutional assumption of the power of Congress to tax;
2) Borrowing in excess of Y would amount to an unconstitutional assumption of the power of Congress to borrow;
and
3) Spending substantially less than Z would violate Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Under these circumstances, I read both Professors Tribe and Buchanan to be saying that number 1) is somehow worse than 2) or 3), while I read Professor Tribe to also be saying that number 2) would be worse than number 3), while Professor Buchanan is saying that number 3) is worse than number 2). I'm less interested in the specifics of their agreement and disagreement than in the shared assumption that runs through all of this--namely, that where a President's only choices are all unconstitutional, some of these choices are more unconstitutional than others.

That strikes me as probably right, but it's worth noting that there's nothing in the text of the Constitution itself that states this principle. Moreover, I am not aware of any well-developed case law, historical practice, or scholarly literature addressing the question of which constitutional violations are worse than others. Maybe the generation of careful thinking about this question will be a beneficial side-effect of our government driving the economy over the cliff.

In my view, the question comes down to whether appropriations bills are mandatory or merely grant permission to spend, which may vary from bill to bill, and the time order in which the debt ceiling and appropriations bills were passed. The concern about raising taxes relative to the other options has something to do with the notion that this involves a less bounded form of discretion than the other options.

READ MORE - Fiscal Choices of Evils

SCOTUS Dislikes Class Actions

Today, a conservative majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision, held that a sex discrimination case against Wal-Mart on behalf of its 1.5 million female employees could not be certified as a class action lawsuit. (There was wide agreement that the backpay due in the case could not be handled on a class basis, but there was deep dispute over whether the existence of gender discrimination at the company could be litigated in that manner.)

This is the latest of a string of cases that have disfavored class actions, such another this term that held that the right to conduct a class action arbitration could not be implied from a simple arbitration clause and that the fact that an arbitration clause expressly prohibits class actions could never be sufficient to render it unconscionable under a provision of the federal arbitration act that allows arbitration clauses to be invalidated if they would be unconscionable under state law.   The rulings have largely been statutory or based on court rules, thus they are more easily overriden than rulings based on constitutional grounds, but the rulings are colored by a deep distrust of the class action generally.

Concerns about class actions have also been a central to the tort reform movement, and have been an area where the movement has achieved more than one significant victory, by imposing major procedural limitations on securities law class actions, and by giving the federal courts jurisdiction over many class actions arising under state law that would not qualify for diversity jurisdiction.  Today's ruling, interpreting the class action rule in the federal rules of civil procedure, thus, has wider implications for class actions generally, than it would have a couple of decades ago, because more kinds of class action lawsuits are confined to the federal courts.

To some extent, the distate of big businesses for class actions, and plaintiff friendly group's support for them is simply a matter of mathematics.  In a situation where there are many people with small claims against a single business or small group of businesses, large numbers of people with claims will never choose to bring valid lawsuits because the litigation cost economics don't make sense, and except in the very clearest cases, the verdicts will be a mixed bag.  In contrast, a win in a class action will afford a remedy to everyone with a claim (or a proxy for them) and a win on behalf of all claimants is possible even when a win on the liability issue isn't a sure thing in any given isolated case.

There is also considerable controversy over the fact that "coupon settlements" and contributions to non-profit caues often replace money awards as typical class action remedies, that class actions are expensive to litigate and rarely result in a resolution on the merits by a judge, that there are often multiple competing class actions that must be consolidated arising from single incidents, that forum shopping can be especially problematic in these cases, and that the cases can seem to be attorney driven rather than focused on providing a remedy for a client.  The high cost and long litigation times involve in class action litigation don't speak well for a process which was invented to reduce litigation costs and handle numerous related small claims more efficiently than traditional litigation efforts.

On the other hand, class actions can put pressure on big businesses to comply with the law even when the state regulators of an industry are asleep at the switch, underfunded, run by a political appointee hostile to the agency's purpose, or are the victim of capture by the regulated industry.  Class actions can close the gap between the laws on the books regulating an industry or practice,  and the law as actually enforced.  It can function as a remedy to corrupt administration of regulatory laws.  Class actions are also an arguable preferrable way to regulate industries through decisions by private individuals rather than actions by state officials whom many people who are inclined towards libertarian political ideologies may distrust.

In employment cases, the key attraction of a class action is the question of proof.  It may be much easier to establish discrimination on a statistical basis than it is to prove that it was present in an individual case, and it may be easier to fashion an affirmative action remedy in response to statistically proven discrimination than it is to wade through the details of a money damage remedy on a case by case basis.

But, class action cases can appear to grant legislative or regulatory type authority to courts whose procedures are primarily geared towards resolving disputes that involve only narrow disputes between small numbers of people.  This tendency is particularly apparent in false advertising claims where very large numbers of people are exposed to advertising claims and considerably numbers of people may buy products that are falsely advertised, but the individualized consumer harm may be modest.  Negotiations between alleged wrongdoers and alleged victim's representatives may also lead to court sanctioned remedies, such as certain forms of affirmative action, that could never be approved as legislation in the absence of a violation of the law that is never provided on the merits in court.

The trend seems contrary to the trends in our economy, in which big corporations whose mistakes routinely impact large numbers of people in incidents with a common source, rather than isolated incidents of wrongdoing, are increasingly the norm.  If a big money center bank calculated interest rates on loans, or forecloses on houses improperly, it will usually be because some system has gone wrong or some computer program had an incorrect rule, with the error affecting hundreds of thousands of people nationwide, rather than because there was some isolated defect in one customer's particular case.  Serious misrepresentations to consumers in commerce not infrequently involve massive advertising campaigns rather than an isolated vendor and purchasers in an open air marketplace.  Serious discrimination in employment practices frequently flows from bad leadership at the top of an organization that guides subordinate managers, rather than individualized misconduct by low level managers.  In our modern era of quality control systems in manufacturing, systemic defeats in mass manufactured products are more likely to cause harm than isolated duds that aren't successfully removed from the assembly line: most defective products are the result of a design defect, either in the product itself or the manufacturing process.  An inability to remedy systemic wrongdoing by a big business in a collective way is out of step with an economic reality in which a large share of all wrongdoing has a systemic source.  In the long run, it may be more important to the functioning of our economic to solve systemic problems than to remedy the one off screw ups that can never be completely eliminated.

For what it is worth, big government agencies, like the I.R.S., have many of the same weaknesses in offering remedies to systemic errors that put individuals in low stakes cases in bind, that big businesses do.

Some problems in the way that big businesses and big government operate, may be flaws in how they do justice between third parties who deal with them, rather than actually benefitting these entities themselves.  For example, most securities fraud involves cases where a misrepresentation by a business causes a stock price to fail to reflect the truth for some period of time, which benefits some secondary market stockholders to the deteriment of other secondary market stockholders, while having little or no direct economic impact on the company itself and where only a tiny part of the benefit or harm accrues to company insiders.  Often the beneficiaries and victims of the misrepresentation have no knowledge that they are acting in the basis of a misrepresentation until after the harm has been done. 

Yet, if misrepresentations with immense economic consequences for stock traders routinely lead to no repurcussions for the parties who make them, the soundness of our financial system is seriously undermined.  Some of the parties most responsible in fact for the financial crisis, the major credit rating companies, had very little other than their pitiful compared to the amount at stake in the economy fees, in their decisions, and will bear no consequences for their mistakes, and there is a movement in the securities law world to treat accountants the same way.  Yet, if the people whose observations drive the market have little stake in being accurate, the financial markets are certain to repeat its world economy shaking mistakes.  Millions of people are out of work and have been for many, many months, in substantial part because the tiny number of people on Wall Street who determined how creditworthy bond issuers were had an insufficiently compelling incentive to get their decisions right.

Part of the barrier to the problem is that power dynamics and self-interest driven policy stances are often so transparent in the tort reform area and in the area of class action litigation in particular, that it is hard to separate and address sincere and legitimate concerns from merely self-serving ones in the policy arena.  Also complicating the effort to find a fair way to deal with the cases that drive class action litigation is that extremely loose class action standards and substantive law claims that can be brought as class actions in a handful of states like California create extremes of the process that suggest solutions that aren't necessarily appropriate for the more strictly regulated federal courts or courts in states like Colorado where class action litigation isn't nearly so common.

READ MORE - SCOTUS Dislikes Class Actions

The Anti-Canon

Dystopia isn't just for science fiction writers.

Argument from the “anticanon,” the set of cases whose central propositions all legitimate decisions must refute, has become a persistent but curious feature of American constitutional law. These cases, Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, Lochner v. New York, and Korematsu v. United States, are consistently cited in Supreme Court opinions, in constitutional law casebooks, and at confirmation hearings as prime examples of weak constitutional analysis.

From here.

Some anti-canonical examples pre-date the Republic. For example, the "Star Chamber" is a classic anti-canonical example against which the Bill of Rights protections for due process are examined.

READ MORE - The Anti-Canon

Obama Concedes DOMA is Unconstitutional

Learning a lesson from the decision of California's leaders in the Prop 8 litigation, where the state refused to appeal a trial court finding that Prop 8 was unconstitutional (the standing of the ballot measure proponents to appeal in that case has been certified to the California Supreme Court), President Obama has directed the Department of Justice to stop defending the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act. The Justice Department has said:

The Attorney General made the following statement today about the Department’s course of action in two lawsuits, Pedersen v. OPM and Windsor v. United States, challenging Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defines marriage for federal purposes as only between a man and a woman: . . . The President has also concluded that Section 3 of DOMA, as applied to legally married same-sex couples, fails to meet that standard and is therefore unconstitutional. . . . [T]he Department will not defend the constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA as applied to same-sex married couples in the two cases filed in the Second Circuit. We will, however, remain parties to the cases and continue to represent the interests of the United States throughout the litigation. I have informed Members of Congress of this decision, so Members who wish to defend the statute may pursue that option. The Department will also work closely with the courts to ensure that Congress has a full and fair opportunity to participate in pending litigation.

Furthermore, pursuant to the President ’ s instructions, and upon further notification to Congress, I will instruct Department attorneys to advise courts in other pending DOMA litigation of the President's and my conclusions that a heightened standard should apply, that Section 3 is unconstitutional under that standard and that the Department will cease defense of Section 3. . . .

Section 3 of DOMA will continue to remain in effect unless Congress repeals it or there is a final judicial finding that strikes it down, and the President has informed me that the Executive Branch will continue to enforce the law. But while both the wisdom and the legality of Section 3 of DOMA will continue to be the subject of both extensive litigation and public debate, this Administration will no longer assert its constitutionality in court.

Colorado's Attorney General, John Suthers, has filed an amicus brief arguing that the Courts should uphold the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, despite the fact that it does not directly impact state law, over the outraged protests of supporters of gay rights in Colorado.

Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act states that the federal government, when applying federal law, shall disregard legal state law marriages that are not between one man and one woman.

The key parts of the Defense of Marriage Act state that:

Section 2. Powers reserved to the states:

No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.

Section 3. Definition of "marriage" and "spouse":

In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.

The decision does not by itself affect Section 2 of the Defense of Marriage Act which provides that the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution does not extend to same sex marriages. Thus, state, local, territorial and Indian tribe governments are not federally required to honor same sex marriages that are valid in other states.

Will President Obama's Position Be Sustained In the Courts?

President Obama's decision is likely to stick. Generally, the only parties with standing to participate in a case where a same sex couple alleges that their rights have been violated by Section 3 of DOMA are the federal government and the couple(s) bringing the lawsuit. The U.S. Supreme Court, particularly in recent years, has construed taxpayer standing (alleging the federal funds are used for an unconstitutional purpose) and citizen standing (alleging that the federal government is acting unconstitutionally) very narrowly.

I'll have to look later at the standing of members of Congress to speak for the federal government in litigation or intervene in lawsuits attacking the constitutionality of a statute. The general rule is that the Justice Department is the sole representative of the U.S. position. But, federal courts have the authority, although not necessarily the obligation, to appoint a lawyer to argue for a position like that constitutionality of a law or the rights of pro se parties, that is not represented by a party in court.

To speak for Congress, per se, or even one house of Congress, would ordinarily require the passage of a resolution by Congress or at least a house of Congress. But, members of Congress who sponsored or voted for legislation might be viewed by a court as suitable intervenors to argue to a court for a position that no party to the suit is willing to advance.

An IRS ruling last year holding that domestic partners in California were entiteld to split income for federal income tax purposes due to community property principles foreshadowed the changing position of the Obama administration on this issue.

Consequences

From a practical perspective, some of the main consequences of the decision are that gay married couples can file tax returns with married filing jointly status (and receive all of the benefits of married couples for estate taxation purposes), that same sex married couples qualify for federal immigration law treatment of spouses, and that same sex married couples can receive Social Security survivors benefits and spousal Veteran's benefits. The Veteran's benefits issue looms large now that Congress has repealed the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" law.

Also, while not quite spelled out by this ruling, the implication seems to be that a same sex couple that is legally married in any state will thereafter be treated as married by the federal government, even if the state in which they live does not recognize same sex marriage. Since some states do recognize same sex marriage (and allow non-residents to be married in their state), that means that same sex couples that go to those states to be married and then return to their home states can receive all of the federal government benefits of marriage.

In addition to undermining the efforts of state governments to deny federal benefits of marriage to same sex couples in their own states, the determination also increases the stakes in the civil union v. gay marriage debate in the states. Until now, this has been a strictly symbolic debate. A civil union bill (SB 11-172) that creates as the legal rights and responsibilities of marriage under state law, but doesn't call it marriage (such as one pending in the Colorado General Assembly right now) would not constitute marriage under federal law, while one that calls the relationship marriage would have that effect.

Thus, states are left with multiple options including: (1) disallow both civil unions and same sex marriages, but acknowledge that couples with legal sex sex marriages from other states may receive federal treatment as married, (2) allow civil unions but not same sex marriage, which gives copules state law marriage rights but denies couples federal treatment as married until they get legally married in another state, or (3) allow same sex marriage.

Also, while Section 2 of DOMA does not require states to recognize same sex marriages from other states, it also does not prohibit them from doing so out of comity. In many states, the issue of when comity should recognize other state's legal acts when the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution does not require it has been left to the courts rather than being made a subject of legislation. Thus, judges could choose, influenced but not bound by the Section 3 of DOMA interpretation, to honor out of state same sex marriage even though the constitution and federal law do not require them to do so.

Civil unions have been a sensible legislative objective for same sex couples in many states, like Colorado, where the state constitution has been amended to prohibit same sex marriage, but not more broadly to prohibit civil unions or domestic partnerships of same sex couples as well. But, there will be increasing pressure to actually call this marriage legislatively, and as courts evaluate the issue.

READ MORE - Obama Concedes DOMA is Unconstitutional

The Showdown In Wisconsin

Republican Governor [of Wisconsin] Scott Walker . . . is pushing a proposal that would eliminate collective bargaining rights for public workers and make them pay half the costs of their pensions and at least 12.6 percent of their health care coverage. The changes amount to about a seven percent salary cut.

From here.

The budget shortfall that is being used to justify the step cuts to state employee pay and denying unions their collective bargaining rights, of course, is a crisis of Governor Walker's own making created by tax cuts that he backed. Unions are willing to discuss compensation custs, but not the loss of their collective bargaining rights.

A core principle of American political conservatives is that unions are bad and should be busted at every available opportunity. As I've noted before at this blog, one of the key points in the Republican playbook at the moment is that public employees, particularly unionized ones, are overpaid relative to private sector workers (despite evidence to the contrary) and that they employees should bear a large share of the public spending cuts that Republicans campaigned on in the 2012 election.

In Wisconsin, where the 2012 election left Republicans in charge of both houses of the state legislature and the Governor's office, they have the votes to put that ideology into action. While private sector union-management relations are governed by the federal government's National Labor Relations Board, states have considerable freedom to adopt laws concerning the rights of their public sector unions.

Since they don't have the votes to win this battle in the legislative process, Wisconsin union members have marched in force (25,000 strong) on the state capital as the legislature considers the bill and state senate Democrats have removed themselves to an undisclosed location to deny Republicans in the state senate the quorum they need to pass the bill, echoing a similar tactic used in Texas redistricting battles within the last few years. Wisconsin also lacks the citizen's initiative process present in states like California and Colorado, that might have given public sector union members in Wisconsin an end run around the normal legislative process. The unions have President Obama's support, but he has little power when it comes to labor relations in state and local government, an area where even the expansive commerce clause power of Congress probably does not extend.

America's private sector union movement in the United States is close to moribund. Maybe this is due to legislative changes, like labor laws that permit the permanent replacement of striking workers and tolerate significant management misconduct in organizing elections. Maybe it is due to the changing character of the economy that has reduced employment in traditionally unionized industries. Maybe labor is a victim of its own success. The causes are a matter of great debate and controversy. The result, however, is not. American private sector unions haven't been so impotent in numbers or as disinclined to cause work stoppages since long before the United States passed its first national labor laws during the Great Depression.

But, public sector unionization has soared and continues to grow in most states. (Colorado is an exception to the trend.) In part, this is because public sector unions, unlike private sector unions, have employees who can't easily be offshored and employers who can't convincing argue that their wages must be kept low in order to prevent them from losing their business to the competition. Civil service protections that public employees hold to protect them from politically motivated corrupt patronage systems have also made it safer to public employees to organize without fear of losing their jobs than comparable private sector employees. Recall that:

In 1950 . . .the unionized workforce of 14.3 million workers . . . made up 31.5% of the total work force.

In 2008 . . . the unionized workforce of 16.1 million workers who made up 12.4% of the total workforce. The public sector which is 36.8% unionized, is as unionized as the private sector was at its peak. The private sector, which is 7.2% unionized, has the lowest level of unionization in the private sector since the 1920s, if not earlier.

This is a huge deal. As I've noted before, policy more often changes through widespread imitation at historic moments than it does through isolated case by case rational analysis. If Wisconsin is successful in breaking its public employees unions and slashing public employee compensation, the trend will almost surely spread to almost every Republican controlled state in the United States. If public unions lose big in Wisconsin it could mean the end of organized labor unions as a potent force in the American economy and political system entirely for much of the United States.

While looming labor-management disputes in the NFL have attracted lots of attention, public sector unions at the state and local government level in places like Wisconsin are the bread and butter of the labor movement in the United States today. This dispute alone involves hundreds of thousands of middle class workers and their families losing three and a half weeks of pay a year.

Public sector unionization is a different animal than private sector unionization. Protection from unfair unemployment termination has generally been a secondary issue for them because they already have civil service protections. Some public sector unions are legally prohibited from going on strike. While private sector unions can organize politically for labor laws and other laws favorable to their members, public sector unions can organize politically to put union friendly politicians in direct control of their employer.

But, the potential for strikes by public employees to rise to the level of general strikes and to bring vital government services to a halt, whether or not it is legal for them to do so, has always loomed in the background, and covert "sick outs" and work to rule slowdowns remind negotiators of that fact. Denver's police (who publicly deny that this was the case) recently carried out just such a slowdown last year over dissatisfaction with the vigor with which the City of Denver had finally decided to apply to cracking down on instances of police misconduct. Wisconsin is experiencing its own sick outs right now.

Assuming that the political process will eventually prevail in Wisconsin and result in public sector union crushing legislation being passed there, the question is how Democrats and labor unions will respond. With the next election almost two years away, working through the normal political process may not seem like a sufficient response to a powerful political player that is facing deep pay cuts for every single one of its members without any opportunity to collectively bargain the matter and is also facing something close to their very extermination as a means by which the economic cause of state workers can be advanced.

If anything can produce a high profile showdown that could shut down the government of the State of Wisconsin entirely through a work stoppage, legal or otherwise, this frontal assault on public employees unions seems to be a good candidate for it. If public employees' unions in Wisconsin lose this fight, they may be gone for good, and may see much of the rest of the public sector labor movement follow them.

Can they win? There is really no way to know until it happens. The last general strike in the United States outside Puerto Rico was in 1934. But, if public sector unions in Wisconsin manage to inflict decisive political pain on the Republican party in the state, even if they lose on the legislative front for the time being, they may have a real shot at remaining a relevant force in American politics.

READ MORE - The Showdown In Wisconsin

Ivory Coast Type Election Issues In Cincinnati

Hamilton County, Ohio, whose principal city is Cincinnati, is faced with an election law issue pertaining to an open, elected partisan juvenile court judgeship election dispute upon which the Ohio Supreme Court and Ohio Secretary of State have ruled one way (don't count the ballots), but a federal district court judge, Chief Judge Susan J. Dlott of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio has reached a contrary result.

What is the Board of Elections member (the Board itself is split two to two and does not agree) to do? The officials in question now face a contempt of court hearing today, which puts the officials at risk of personally going to jail or being fined, for failing to honor a federal court order that is contrary to a state court order.

Generally, elections are matters of state law. But, if a federal constitutional right or federal statute is implicated, federal law supersedes state law. And, while the 11th Amendment prevents state governments from having to deal with cases in federal trial courts, state and local government officials in suits not seeking money damages and arising under federal law, and suits against governmental entities distinct from state governments are not subject to that limitations. Doctrines that one learns when studying the federal courts generally provide that a final ruling of either a federal court or state court is binding on the parties who may not then forum shop for another judge with a more favorable outlook on the case. In particular, a federal trial court may not generally sit as an appellate body with regard to a state court ruling in a civil matter. But, since the law in this federal v. state jurisdiction area is so complex, even in cases arising out of purely state office elections (which are far simpler than cases arising out of federal elections, like Bush v. Gore, where a host of special constitutional rules apply), judicial rulings are sometimes hard to predict in this cases and judges come to different conclusions in the face of hot partisan conflict that often sees judges and elections officials lining up along the lines that their political histories would suggest, despite their duties to enforce the laws impartially.

Republican John Williams leads Democrat Tracie Hunter by 23 votes in the official count, but the parties disagree on how to handle 849 provisional ballots that were not counted.

The ballots were set aside on Election Day because poll workers believed they were cast at the wrong precinct.

Dlott, however, has said 149 of those ballots were cast at the wrong precinct because of poll worker error and should be counted. Many may have been cast at the wrong table even though voters cast their ballot in the right building.

The [federal] judge said failing to count ballots that were disregarded through no fault of the voter would violate the 14th Amendment’s requirement that all citizens receive equal protection under the law.

Partisan, Personal and Federalism Issues Involved

There is a partisan dimension to this struggle as there is in most election law cases.

The Board of Elections is split two posts for Republicans, two for Democrats, split evenly by design.

The Ohio Secretary of State is an elected Republican and favors the Ohio Supreme Court position that lets the Republican judge win. Six of the seven officially non-partisan elected justices on the Ohio Supreme Court were nominated by the Republican party and known to have Republican affinities.

The Democrats on the Board, however, would like a recount, as the federal judge, who was appointed by President Clinton, a Democrat, in 1995 when Democrat John Glenn and Republican Mike DeWine were U.S. Senators from Ohio, has ordered. Dayton native Dlott is married to Stanley M. Chesley (a trial lawyer more familiar to me than almost any lawyer in Denver by name, despite the fact that I haven't lived in the area for a copule of decades), lives in the most expensive single-family home ever listed in Greater Cincinnati, shows dogs, and has won praise for her racial sensitivity and even handed management and resolution of complex cases.

The Secretary of State is (by design) normally a partisan tie breaker for county boards of election, in this case on the issue of whether the federal court ruling should be appealed to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals. If the 6th Circuit overules the trial judge, the conflict between the courts no longer exists, but, should the United States Court of Appeal for the 6th Circuit (which is neither particular conservative nor particularly liberal as federal appellate courts go in the United States at the moment) affirm the trial court's ruling (in which she is entitled to considerable deferrence in a number of respects), its authority vis-a-vis the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling is just as ambiguous as the trial court's ruling. Only the U.S. Supreme Court has clear jurisdiction over both the state and the federal judges in this case.

The case also pits concerns about federal involvement in state and local government operations against concerns about fairness in elections in a system controlled by political allies of the aggrieved candidate. Stereotypically (for modern times), it is the Republicans who are pressing a state's rights argument in this case, and the Democrats who are pressing for federal involvement in the interest of civil rights.

There is also a perceived racial element to the contest. Hamilton County is 70% white and 25% African-American, with the African-American population predominantly in Cincinnati, the central city, ahd the white population disproportionately in suburban Hamilton County. Democrat Tracie Hunter, a former public defender and guardian ad litem, who is also a pastor and radio personality is an African-American woman, while Republican John Williams, a former prosecutor campaigning with a tough on crime agenda in a court where most of the defendants are African-American juveniles and African-American parents, is a white man whose website prominently displays white Hamilton county suburbanites in the background, in a county just on the border between Northern leaning Ohio and Southern leaning border state Kentucky.

To be perfectly honest, if I had been forced to vote in that election, I wouldn't have been terribly happy with either of my choices. Both candidates are partisans seeking a post that demands neutrality and evenhandedness.

Voters were very evenly split in the race, and usually, in this kind of situation, where a significant number of provisional ballots are at issue, a recount will favor a Democrat. It wouldn't be surprising for an apparently heavy handed or partial ruling to lead to a riot in Cincinnati.

The Stakes

This all sounds like a very technical issue of civil procedure and election law, with valid legal considerations on both sides of the case.

The outcome of this case won't directly affect anyone who doesn't do have a connection to Hamilton County Juvenile Court, a county where 99.7% of the population of the United States doesn't live, and with which 95%+ of the population of Hamilton County will never have any business. It has one other judge in addition to the position at stake in this election, and the Juvenile Court's rulings are very important to those who are before the court, and who in making child custody decisions and juvenile delinquency sentencing decisions has immense discretion.

Life will go on with either resolution of the matter, so long as it is resolved, and there is really no room for compromise. Neither candidate has shown any basis for a do over of the election, only one can be elected for a long term to the only judgeship on the court, and the judicial ideologies and the personal experiences that the candidates bring to the court are very different. Either way, unhappen litigants can try to appeal rulings without a proper legal basis.

Cote D'Ivoire Compared

But, while this particular case in Ohio won't change the world, an extremely similar legal issue in Cote D'Ivoire's 2010 Presidential election, in West Africa, in a country only a little larger in size and area than Ohio (it has 20.6 million people up by a third in the last decade alone, while Ohio has about 11.5 million although probably a similar number of adults of voting age; it has 124,502 square miles, while Ohio has 44,825 square miles; both have strong regional and ethnic partisan divides), in which a Board of Elections and independent election observers came to one conclusion on the outcome of a contested election dispute arising out of vote counting concerns (in favor of the contesting candidate Alassane Ouattara), while the Constitutional Court of the country came to a contrary determination (in favor of the incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo).

The election dispute in Cote D'Ivoire has brought that country to the brink of civil war, despite the absence of a complicated mix of federal courts. Scores or hundreds of people have died already in the several week old dispute. The international community has sided with the challenger (in part on the merits, and in part because the incumbent has manipulated the electoral process in undemocratic ways that were to be put behind the country in free and fair elections in 2010), while the incumbent appears to have practical control of most instruments of state power in the country.

UPDATE: The 6th Circuit has entered a stay in the case. All the original source documents you could ever want can be found here.

READ MORE - Ivory Coast Type Election Issues In Cincinnati

Ideas Interrupted

Every once and a while, I start to make a blog post, get interrupted, and it ends up with some links and some half finished analysis in my blogs collection of draft posts. The analysis is often unsalvagable, either because it was too fragmented, or because it was topical and now untimely, but the links are often worthwhile references, so I don't delete the draft posts. In an effort to clear my backlog of draft posts, here are some interesting links that I collected and might have blogged about over the last few years, that didn't make it to the front page. Think of it as a director's cut.

* A Gallup Survey looks at who identifies as a Republican and looks at eight year trends as of May 2009. At that low point, the Republican party was older, more conservative and more religious than it had been in the past. The young, liberals, moderates, the less affluent and more secular voters left it in droves.

* The removal of the President of Hondorus in 2009 may have had sound legal justification.

*"The U.S. Court of Appeals on Wednesday released a ruling in favor of a group of zombies who say they were wrongfully arrested while protesting consumerism during the 2006 Aquatennial." From here (ruling here).

* Tampa cops apparently don't like clowns any more than Minneapolis cops like zombies.

* "Leading theories of the Eleventh Amendment start from the premise that its text makes no sense." From here.

If you have been taught that the United States Constitution was a document of near perfection, you haven't studied enough constitutional law. The Eleventh Amendment is a good example of both this truth, and of the limits of a "plain text" understanding of the document.

Leading theories of the Eleventh Amendment start from the premise that its text makes no sense.

From here.

The text of the Eleventh Amendment reads:

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extent to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.

It amends the following language of Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution (language naiively modified by the Eleventh Amendment emphasized):

The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and counsuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more states; between a state and citizens of another state; between citizens of different states; between citizens of the same state, claiming lands under grants of different states; and between a state or citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens and subjects.

In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction.

The Eleventh Amendment has been read by prevailing constitutional law to include not just the edits to Article III that its plain text encompasses (shown above), but also to establish a substantive doctrine of sovereign immunity for state governments, with selected exceptions, and embellished with permissible strategies to avoid the limitation.

For example, while local government are treated as part of the state government for most purposes, many local governments and independent governmental agencies as distinct from the state government for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Also, the case law permits suits against governmental officials for actions that they have taken in their official capacity, rather than seeing them as benefiting fully from sovereign immunity from suits against states in federal trial courts. State permission is inferred when states are parties to bankruptcy cases (or alternately, state sovereign immunity is abrogated in those cases). In practice, the exceptions swallow the rule, which has been narrowed to prohibiting in practice only suits for money damages against the parts of state governments which are financed with tax money.

More particularly, going beyond the express terms of the Eleventh Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment has been held to prohibit citizens of a state from suing their own state on a federal question theory in federal court, despite the fact that this isn't clearly prohibited by the terms of the U.S. Constitution, if the suit is commenced in the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Eleventh Amendment is routinely applied in this way.

The Eleventh Amendment is, in fact, applied to limit the authority of the federal government to sue states, since allowing citizens of a state, but not non-citizens of a state to sue a state in federal court on a federal question seems absurd, even though this is not expressly banned by the Eleventh Amendment.

The Eleventh Amendment, by its terms, also does not apply to admiralty suits, as opposed to those arising "in law and equity," although the case law does not draw such a clear line, as the U.S. Supreme Court explained in California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1464 (1998).

The article linked explains this situation:

Anti-federalists threatened to undermine this case for the Constitution by arguing that the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III — authorizing suits "between" states and out-of-state citizens — could be construed to permit suits against states (and thus imply federal power to enforce any resulting judgments against states). Although Federalists denied this construction, the Supreme Court proceeded to read Article III to permit out-of-state citizens to sue states. Federalists and Anti-federalists quickly joined forces to restore their preferred construction of Article III.

In adopting the Eleventh Amendment, they saw no anomaly in prohibiting “any suit” against a state by out-of-state citizens because they did not understand the Constitution to authorize any suits against states by in-state citizens. Federal question jurisdiction did not expressly authorize such suits, and the Founders likely would not have perceived any real need for such jurisdiction given their understanding that the Constitution conferred neither legislative nor coercive power over states. Because the Eleventh Amendment, as written, made sense in light of the nature of the Union, the absurdity doctrine cannot justify departing from the terms of the Amendment.

In other words, this author too finds that the Founders didn't really believe that Article III really meant what it actually says.

Since suits against states in federal courts other than the U.S. Supreme Court are prohibited by the clear language of Article III, it would have been possible, and probably more desirable from the point of view of matching case law to the actual language of the U.S. Connstitution, for the U.S. Supreme Court to simply adopt of refusing to exercise its power to hear suits between private parties and states in non-admiralty cases on forum non conveniens grounds, rather than jurisdictional grounds, rather than creating the expansive concept of state sovereign immunity. But, this isn't how the doctrine has evolved.

READ MORE - Ideas Interrupted

Should States Be Allowed To Go Bankrupt?

Some commentators think that the two main victims of bankruptcy by a state government would be unionized state employees and state bondholders.

I'm not sure about that result. In practice, when national governments get in debt over their heads, they tend to either dishonor their obligations (e.g. Confederate bonds and bonds from Iceland), sometimes only temporarily while issuing IOUs (a la California's recent experience), or enact austerity plans that increase taxes and reduce public spending together with a restructuring of the timing of debt obligations (as Ireland and Greece recently did). But, courts have also been deeply reluctant to order tax increases, even when a state is not meeting its judicially determined obligations to pay its debts. It isn't even clear if this could ever be consistent with the Republican government clause of the United States Constitution.

Given creditors have few involuntary collection remedies against state governments, it is perhaps remarkable that they pay as reliably as they do.

Public employees are typically paid in a timely manner, and have their pension funds deposited in an account in which they arguably have property rights that cannot be abrogated by legislative act (although others would argue that the defined benefit and not the funds set aside for payment of defined benefits are the things in which public employees have pension rights, contrary to recent Colorado action reducing future defined benefits). The pensions are often underfunded, but in practice, determining funding sufficiency is more art than science, and I am not aware of any state pension that is so deeply underfunded that it cannot meet its current payout obligations for the next few years. Underfunding is typically discussed in terms of the ability of pension funds to meet their obligations a decade or more in the future given conservative actuarial and investment return assumptions.

Unionized employees also have union contracts that limit flexibility in adjusting their pay, but typically not preventing layoffs. But, it isn't obvious that the government can hire enough qualified employees without offering something close to what it does to its employees. Moreover, if bankruptcy reorganizations offer any lesson, it is that trade creditors (i.e. those necessary for the ongoing day to day conduct of the business) usually come out better than their formal legal preference in the process would suggest, because their refusal to offer further services would typically make a reorganization impossible.

Also, while American public sector labor relations have historically been rather placid, there are numerous international examples of public employees exercising immense practical power through labor union coordinated labor actions (whose legality is often irrelevant for practical purposes, unless one is willing to fire them all as Reagan did in the aircraft controller's strike). An unprecedented deep blow to unionized public employees via a state's bankruptcy, could be just the thing to trigger that latent power. Even a credible threat of a European or Latin American class public employees strike might give public employees considerable bargaining power in a bankruptcy negotiation.

Putting the squeeze on public employees via a state bankruptcy is also complicated by the fact that many public employees either have deeper constitutional protections from pay cuts (e.g. judges), a compensated out of a dedicated funding source (like Secretary of State filing fees) that has not been exhausted, or are a step removed from state government, with direct employers who are local governments (e.g. school districts) or autonomous entities (like public universities and airports and hospitals) that may themselves not be bankrupt and unable to meet their obligations, even if the state that has sponsored them is unable to pay its bills. A surprisingly small share of all public employees are compensated directly out of state general funds by state government, and some of them (e.g. prison guards and tax collectors) are difficult to fire en masse in a revenue enhancing, public safety tolerable way.

Vendors to the state, such as doctors owed Medicaid reimbursements and non-profits that have been awarded grants to provide some public service, might be in a weaker position than public employees. They may cease to do business with state government to cut their losses, and the state may be able to tolerate significant levels of defection of that kind.

Municipal bondholders might see their payments deferred significantly, with interest at the municipal bond rate, but not discharged. They might, in other words, be allowed to enter judgments against the state, but not allowed to enforce those judgments. This might make it impossible for the state to borrow new debt at less than crushing subprime interest rates, or without some special form of collateral, guarantee or creditor protection.

READ MORE - Should States Be Allowed To Go Bankrupt?