Denver's Election Results

In Tuesday's non-partisan election, Denver voters re-elected their incumbent auditor, chose two city council members for "at large" seats, and elected eight of eleven city council people from single member districts (five in uncontested elections). Turnout was 38% of the ballots distributed, with ballots going out to all active registered voters in the City, slightly below the norm in the last couple of municipal elections, but not horrible either.

There will be runoffs between the top two finishers in the first round in City Council Districts 1, 5 and 8, and in the races for Mayor and Clerk and Recorder. All of the races with runoffs happen, not coincidentally, to be open seats. As my own city council district race was uncontested, the ballot that I will receive and return by June 7 will have only four names for two offices on it, and I've given those names at least some consideratioon already in the first round.

The Case For Non-Instant Runoffs

Proponents of a system once called the "single transferable vote" and now called "instant runoff voting" would favor a system where you get to vote a first and second and perhaps higher order choice, allowing the election to be decided all in one go, even when no candidate receives a majority.

The case for considering the preferences of voters who didn't vote for the plurality candidate when no candidate receives a majority is a good one. Denver voters, for example, have not infrequently backed a runner up in a runoff election, suggesting that a combination of more information and the preferences of candidates who supported someone who was not one of the two finalists don't, as a reliable general rule, strongly favor the plurality winnner in this kind of non-partisan race.

I prefer the system used by Denver, Louisiana and France, where there is a runoff election, because it allows me as a voter to have more time to research viable candidates and consider my options before making a decision in the second round, even when the candidate that I favored in the first round is not eliminated. Any decision that causes decisions upon which there is not a clear popular preference to be made based on more information and deliberation than would otherwise be devoted to the decision is probably a good thing.

I also have little confidence that my fellow citizens would make second choice decisions that are as good if they didn't have this extra time. I've written wills and trusts for people for a decade and a half, and most of my clients, even when they are well educated, find it a strain to think about "what if" hypotheticals beyond the situation that would exist if they died today. Most people are better at making decisions in a "what now" context than in a "what if" context. Frequently, I have to spend a long time talking people through the ideas by telling little stories at length "what if you and your partner and your children all died in a car crash today, the people you've mentioned who are still alive are . . . . who would you want to inherit from you now?"

There is also more of an incentive to do good media coverage of a runoff election between two candidates proven to be viable and reasonably close in electoral strength which may reveal new critical data than there is in the waning days of a nine or more way race.

In an election with many candidates there is a tendency to engage in satisficing decision making, i.e. researching until you find an acceptable choice rather than trying to research carefully enough to find the best choice. If most people make their decisions that way, and no one candidate receives a majority of the vote, the likelihood that the first round winner was not the optimal choice is pretty good. So, the chances that additional information before the runoff election is held will improve the quality of the decision making process is pretty good.

This is particularly true in a case like City Council District 8, which was entirely a write in election due to the death of incumbent Carla Madison shoertly before the election. The very short schedule for that race meant that there was very little time for the thirty-nine candidates in the race to run full fledged campaigns that could have afforded the general public the information they needed to make an optimizing decision. About 28% of voters in that district didn't cast a vote for the office at all, and each of the candidates that made the runoff from the 5,361 write in votes cast captured only about 1/7th of the votes cast. Eleven candidates received at least one hundred votes (including the two candidates making it to the runoff), and five candidates received more than three hundred votes (the number of signatures needed to petition onto the ballot in ordinary circumstances).

The Benefits Of Ballot Access

It is also a good moment to observe the benefits that accrue to being on the ballot, even in an election like this one, where voters could complete their ballot at their leisure "open book" at their kitchen table, rather than without access to pertinent information in a voting booth under time pressures, a relatively ideal environment for write in candidates.

The practical ability of voters to cast a write in vote if they are determiend to do so is illustrated by the fact that in City Council District 8 almost four-fifths of voters managed to cast a valid write in ballot. Also, no city council race in the city, with or without names on the ballot had an undervote of less than 5% and the average undervote was considerably higher. Thus, no more than 18% of voters were discouraged by the all write in character of the race from casting a vote, and the average undervote percentage in contested city council races was closer to 10%, suggesting that perhaps only one in seven voters was discouraged by the write in character of the District 8 vote from casting a vote.

In the Mayoral race, every candidate who appeared on the ballot received at least 0.46% of the vote (519 votes). Marcus Giavanni, the most successful of the three write in candidates for Mayor, who mounted an active campaign with at least as many signs up around town as some of the other candidates whose names appeared on the ballot, nonetheless garnered just 21 votes. The cutoff to make the second round in the Mayoral race based on the unofficial results was 30,314 votes (27% of the total). The third place candidate in the Mayoral race, after conferring with campaign legal counsel, has announced that he will not challenge the unofficial vote count. None of the races in the first round were close enough to trigger an automatic recount.

In the Council Member At Large race, in which the one of the five candidates appearing on the ballot with the least votes received 8,437 votes (6% of the total cast in a race where each voter could vote for up to two candidates), none of the three write in candidates received more than 121 votes. The cutoff to win a seat, according to the unofficial results, was 31,603 votes (22% of the total number of votes cast in a race where each voter may vote up to two times).

Unless no one is who appears on the ballot is running for an office, it is almost impossible to win a write in campaign, in an ordinary electoral environment where the barriers to ballot access for credible candidates who have their acts together is not overwhelming. But, this isn't necessarily deeply troubling from a democratic perspective, because the practical reality is that the candidates who did not receive access to the ballot probably had a very dim chance of winning office even if they had been granted access to the ballot. No write in candidate outside Council District 8, which had no candidate on the ballot, received more than 121 write in votes in an election where three hundred signatures on a petition are required to gain access to the ballot - a requirement that is less than 1% of the votes that were actually required to win or advance to a second round in a citywide race this year.

No candidate outside Council District 8 in a city council race received more than 70 write in votes, less than 1% of the votes received by the winner in that city council district, an otherwise uncontested incumbent.

An Expensive Mayoral Race

Campaign spending in this election was considerable.

Romer, through last Thursday, spent about $1.4 million on his successful campaign, which turns out to be about $43 a vote. Hancock spent about $711,489, which equals about $23 per vote.

Theresa Spahn spent $108,288 but got only 3,332 votes, roughly $32.50 a vote. Councilman Doug Linkhart had spent $152,199 through last Thursday on his campaign that received a total of 10,557 votes, about $14.41 per vote. Viewed this way, the biggest winner was probably Thomas Wolf, who dubbed himself the "free candidate" because he accepted no money and spent only $250. He got 2,106 votes, about 12 cents a vote.

Running the election, of course, also wasn't free, although the city of Denver, as is typical in mail in elections in Colorado, didn't provide postage to voters, which cost voters who didn't hand deliver their ballots 61 cents each, a barrier that probably had a measurable effect on turnout.

READ MORE - Denver's Election Results

The Entrenched Politician-Voter Disconnect

It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried.

- Sir Winston Churchill, British politician (1874 - 1965)

Churchill's wisdom has much to be said for it, except that it doesn't do much to tell us which kind of democracy is to be preferred to the alternatives.

An important flaw of the American system, and some similar systems, is that it deeply and fundamentally entrenches a process that naturally produces an unstable equilibrium that is at always odds with voter desires in one direction or the other, rather than a stable process that consistently produces elected representatives who seek to maximize the popularity of the decisions made by the government.



Enik Rising (Seth Masket's blog) reports research that he and Hans Noel have done with a clever experimental design that establishes empirically and rigorously the empirical wisdom that:

There are actually plenty of moderate Assembly districts in California; there are basically no moderate Assembly members. Virtually every Democrat in the Assembly is more liberal than her district; virtually every Republican member is more conservative than her district. . . .

We also find that members of the majority party tend to deviate further from their districts than members of the minority party do. Time out of office, we suggest, causes the minority party to try to moderate to win back the majority.

The study focused on California, but its conclusions almost surely hold for all but a couple of states in the United States (Nebraska and Louisiana may be exceptions).

Actual partisanship in legislative districts has a bell curve distribution. Elected legislators have a bimodal distribution, like a two humped camel. The political middle is systemically underpopulated by elected officials, despite the fact that the vast majority of voters are in the political middle between the typical elected Democrat and the typical elected Republican on the spectrum of ideology from the political left to the political right.

The study is focused, appropriately, on the facts, rather than the causes for those facts. But, political theory would suggest that this outcome is a very natural and direct consequence of our election laws and legislative process.

The Electoral Bias Against Moderation

Single member plurality district election system naturally gravitates towards having two dominant political parties in any one geographic area. In that system, adding a new credible candidate to the mix hurts that candidate's allies and helps that candidate's enemies. In order to mitigate mutually self-destructive behavior, we have entrenched, in the United States, a two party system in which the political left and the political right choose nominees in partisan primaries and then face off against each other.

The single member plurality district system doesn't necessarily have to create a two party system. It can support regional parties that have majority support in a particular area, like a Quebec Nationalist party or Irish Republican Party. It also doesn't require that the party of the right be the same everywhere, or that the party of the left be the same everywhere. Canadians have one party of the right to the West of Ontario, and another one, the Tory's to the East. One U.S. States have a Democrat-Farm-Labor Party rather than a Democratic party. The U.S. historically used to have, de facto, Dixiecrats in some parts of the country, and Democrats in other partys of the country, both against a common Republican party.

But, for distinct regional parties to emerge, something has to give that region a strong identity. The more homogeneous a region is politically, the less prone it is to develop a distinct political party.

A Majority Requirement As a Weak Fix

A weak solution to this problem is to use French style elections, which have been adopted in Louisiana, Denver and in a less pure form, in a handful of states, where the winner of the election needs to get a majority of the votes cast to win in the first round, with the top two vote getters facing off in a second round.

While this isn't immune to the pathology that similar candidates tend to undermine each other, it eliminates the requirement that a candidate wanting to make it into the second round must have a plurality coalition made up entirely of partisan voters on the right, or partisan voters on the left. A coalition of unaffiliated and bipartisan moderate voters can also secure a candidate a second round slot.

More generally, in its pure form, it is more more neutral towards the number of political parties competing in the district than a traditional two party system. Not surprisingly, Louisiana has historically been the source of moderate candidates in both the Democratic and Republican political parties.

Proportional Representation As A Strong Fix

A stronger solution to this problem would be a true proportional representation system that doesn't penalize two political parties for having similar views without not actually merging. In a system where each voter picks on political party and that party gets a number of seats proportional to the share of the vote received by that political party, the sensible thing for a voter to do is the pick the party most closely aligned with their views and a political party doesn't face a penalty for being small unless its market share approaches the treshold minimum percentage necessary to secure representation in the legislature (typically in the low single digit percentages). A proportional representation system also allows representation of parties that have a majority in no particular district.

This kind of true multi-party system, which naturally gravitated towards roughly four to eight major political parties, leads to unequal sized clusters of voters with much more homogeneous views.

The Legislative Bias Against Moderation

When Are Coalitions Made? How Stable Must They Be?

In an idealized two party system, coalitions need to be assembled before the election. In an idealized multi-party system, coalitions are made after the election.

In a parliamentary system, a governing coalition forming a legislative majority, need to hold together on all major issues for the political system to function. The legislative leader becomes the head of government (i.e. the Prime Minister) who runs government on a day to day basis. If the coalition that put the Prime Minister in place fails to secure majority support for any major proposal, the Prime Minister will typicall then lose a "no confidence" vote in short order, and new elections will typically be held.

Somewhat complicating the matter of coalition building is that American legislative coalitions don't need to be very stable across all or most issues. Since we have a strong President whose tenure doesn't hinge upon maintaining a legislative majority (indeed our current President doesn't have one), the executive branch can continue to function and carry out the business of government even when one coalition of legislators may prevail on one set on issues, and another coalition of legislators may prevail on a different set of issues.

Historically, for example, the U.S. had a de facto "two and a half" party system at the national Congressional level. One domestic economic issues Democrats generally united against Republicans. But, on matters of national defense and social issues like race, Southern Democrats often allied themselves with Republicans against Northern Democrats. The Democratic Presidential nomination race reflected the vacillation between these two factions.

This three party system allowed the party that was moderate on any issue where there was no consensus among the three parties to prevail, moderating the process as a whole to some extent.

Today, after a process called "realignment" that has largely run its course, this isn't the case any more. There are few notable blocks of "moderates" in either the Republican Party or the Democratic Party in Congress who deviate from their party in a systematic way on a particular way. The Blue Dog faction in the Democratic Party has withered, as has the faction of Northeastern social moderate Republicans. We have a relatively pure party of the political left and a relatively pure party of the political right, and they are quite evenly matched on the national political scene.

The Majoritarian Legislative Process Has A Hidden Bias Against Moderation

Of course, some of the partisanship we see at the legislative level is a product not just of a two party electoral system, but is inherent in the legislative process itself. Legislative decision making generally involved for or against voting on politically controversial issues. Partisans get the results most to their liking when they favor proposals the secure majorities, but only the narrowest majorities possible. It is natural, in this context, for legislators to informally rank themselves from the political left to the political right, and for proposals that require legislators to form an allegiance with one side or the other to be common.

Thus, even in multi-party proportional representation system, governing coalitions that are clearly right leaning, or clearly left leaning are the norm. Governing coalitions like the Penteparti system of Italy, in which five mainstream parties formed repeated unstable and short lived coalitions in the political center in a calculated effort to exclude old school communists on the left, and old school fascists on the right, ar the exception, except in times of national peril from an outside force like the unity governments of the United Kingdom during World War II.

Moderates are more favored in a place like the U.S. Senate, that is not strictly majoritarian, with most proposals from the left or the right requiring supermajority support, than in the U.S. House, where majority rule prevails.

In order to favor the kind of moderate policies that voters in the political center favor, you need not only an electoral system that doesn't naturally generate a bimodal distribution of legislators, but also a legislative process that has stronger incentives to find supermajority, rather than mere majority support for legislation.

Supermajority Requirements Come At The Risk of Deadlock

Favoring supermajorities, however, comes at a cost. Any requirement that there be more than majority support for a measure in a single legislative body with ultimate say over the matter creates a risk that the system will be overconstrained and fail to produce action in situations where there is no acceptable status quo.

In the United States, recess appointment power and a strong Presidency prevent the status quo of all important positions in the government going unfilled for lack of a resolution to deadlocks between a nominating executive and a ratifying Senate. But, at both the state and at the federal level, it remains possible for a lack of an ability to reach consensus in a deterministic way on a budget bill to produce a government shutdown, something that House Republicans on one side, and Senate Democrats and the President on the other, have been dancing with in the lame duck session of the 2010 Congress and the current Congress.

Probably the most notable recent example of an overconstrained set of legislative rules in recent memory is that of the Iraqi Constitution, which requires supermajority support to choose a President and Prime Minister, at a time when there is stark disagreement between well defined factions that individually lack that supermajority (whose moderate unanimity the constitution attempted to coax). The result has been many months of government deadlock due to a lack of the required consensus. Afghanistan's constitution, notably, in contrast, was carefully crafted to allow the President to impose a budget and appointees in the absence of constructive disagreement by a legislative majority on an alternative (despite the fact that Afghanistan has less well defined factions in any case).

Supermajority Processes In Practice

The best examples of supermajority incentives in the legislative process are probably the adminsitrative law notice and comment process, and the Quaker meeting process, each of which hinges on having a "honest third party" receive input and try to formulate from the input a maximally popular (in the case of administrative rule making) or maximal consensus (in the case of Quaker meeting decision making) stance, by taking into account the details of the concerns expressed.

Monarchs, because they are well positioned to be that honest third party, can, if they are not politically tone deaf, secure support in the fact of partisan elected bodies, precisely by favoring the middle against partisan majorities, and favoring solutions that would secure supermajority support over those that would secure mere majority support.

I think that the Founders probably hoped (largely in vain) for that kind of dynamic to play out in the American political system, something that failed largely because the Presidential election system got locked into the two party dichotomy. It isn't implausible to think that if the Presidential election process could be redesigned to decouple it from partisan politics and instead have this office elected in a way that favored moderates, that a similar dynamic could be established, even without reform at the legislative level, through the veto power.

Indeed, I think it is a fair hypothesis that Governor Ritter's experience with consensus oriented politics as the norm from his days as a special interest advocate for Colorado's District Attorneys' Association may help explain a great deal of his approach to dealing with the Colorado General Assembly, in which he frequently cited process rather than substance oriented objections to legislation in veto messages.

Good legislators in the existing legislative process frequently try to craft such agreements in "smoke filled room" negotiations involving interested parties with a goal of reaching "kumbaya" (i.e. a consensus of the interested parties to support a bill). But, this kind of deal making and mutal accomodation reaching is ill suited to the formal legislative process.

Consensus or supermajority oriented politics are actually much more common than most people would think, indeed, it is the norm. This is because partisan caucuses and special interest groups much each reach consensus or something close to it in order to move boldly on legislative proposals. They tend to stay silent and refrain from acting in the absence of consensus.

Conclusion

In the absence of divided government (something that both the U.S. Congress and Colorado General Assembly are experiencing right now), there is little incentive to stretch beyond a majority supported compromise.

So, in American politics, voters are left between insisting that government function with deals negotiated between the left and right in exchange for a risk a damaging deadlock, within divided government, and government by a right of center, or left of center consensus with little to encourage it to be inclusive.

READ MORE - The Entrenched Politician-Voter Disconnect

Ivory Coast Type Election Issues In Cincinnati

Hamilton County, Ohio, whose principal city is Cincinnati, is faced with an election law issue pertaining to an open, elected partisan juvenile court judgeship election dispute upon which the Ohio Supreme Court and Ohio Secretary of State have ruled one way (don't count the ballots), but a federal district court judge, Chief Judge Susan J. Dlott of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio has reached a contrary result.

What is the Board of Elections member (the Board itself is split two to two and does not agree) to do? The officials in question now face a contempt of court hearing today, which puts the officials at risk of personally going to jail or being fined, for failing to honor a federal court order that is contrary to a state court order.

Generally, elections are matters of state law. But, if a federal constitutional right or federal statute is implicated, federal law supersedes state law. And, while the 11th Amendment prevents state governments from having to deal with cases in federal trial courts, state and local government officials in suits not seeking money damages and arising under federal law, and suits against governmental entities distinct from state governments are not subject to that limitations. Doctrines that one learns when studying the federal courts generally provide that a final ruling of either a federal court or state court is binding on the parties who may not then forum shop for another judge with a more favorable outlook on the case. In particular, a federal trial court may not generally sit as an appellate body with regard to a state court ruling in a civil matter. But, since the law in this federal v. state jurisdiction area is so complex, even in cases arising out of purely state office elections (which are far simpler than cases arising out of federal elections, like Bush v. Gore, where a host of special constitutional rules apply), judicial rulings are sometimes hard to predict in this cases and judges come to different conclusions in the face of hot partisan conflict that often sees judges and elections officials lining up along the lines that their political histories would suggest, despite their duties to enforce the laws impartially.

Republican John Williams leads Democrat Tracie Hunter by 23 votes in the official count, but the parties disagree on how to handle 849 provisional ballots that were not counted.

The ballots were set aside on Election Day because poll workers believed they were cast at the wrong precinct.

Dlott, however, has said 149 of those ballots were cast at the wrong precinct because of poll worker error and should be counted. Many may have been cast at the wrong table even though voters cast their ballot in the right building.

The [federal] judge said failing to count ballots that were disregarded through no fault of the voter would violate the 14th Amendment’s requirement that all citizens receive equal protection under the law.

Partisan, Personal and Federalism Issues Involved

There is a partisan dimension to this struggle as there is in most election law cases.

The Board of Elections is split two posts for Republicans, two for Democrats, split evenly by design.

The Ohio Secretary of State is an elected Republican and favors the Ohio Supreme Court position that lets the Republican judge win. Six of the seven officially non-partisan elected justices on the Ohio Supreme Court were nominated by the Republican party and known to have Republican affinities.

The Democrats on the Board, however, would like a recount, as the federal judge, who was appointed by President Clinton, a Democrat, in 1995 when Democrat John Glenn and Republican Mike DeWine were U.S. Senators from Ohio, has ordered. Dayton native Dlott is married to Stanley M. Chesley (a trial lawyer more familiar to me than almost any lawyer in Denver by name, despite the fact that I haven't lived in the area for a copule of decades), lives in the most expensive single-family home ever listed in Greater Cincinnati, shows dogs, and has won praise for her racial sensitivity and even handed management and resolution of complex cases.

The Secretary of State is (by design) normally a partisan tie breaker for county boards of election, in this case on the issue of whether the federal court ruling should be appealed to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals. If the 6th Circuit overules the trial judge, the conflict between the courts no longer exists, but, should the United States Court of Appeal for the 6th Circuit (which is neither particular conservative nor particularly liberal as federal appellate courts go in the United States at the moment) affirm the trial court's ruling (in which she is entitled to considerable deferrence in a number of respects), its authority vis-a-vis the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling is just as ambiguous as the trial court's ruling. Only the U.S. Supreme Court has clear jurisdiction over both the state and the federal judges in this case.

The case also pits concerns about federal involvement in state and local government operations against concerns about fairness in elections in a system controlled by political allies of the aggrieved candidate. Stereotypically (for modern times), it is the Republicans who are pressing a state's rights argument in this case, and the Democrats who are pressing for federal involvement in the interest of civil rights.

There is also a perceived racial element to the contest. Hamilton County is 70% white and 25% African-American, with the African-American population predominantly in Cincinnati, the central city, ahd the white population disproportionately in suburban Hamilton County. Democrat Tracie Hunter, a former public defender and guardian ad litem, who is also a pastor and radio personality is an African-American woman, while Republican John Williams, a former prosecutor campaigning with a tough on crime agenda in a court where most of the defendants are African-American juveniles and African-American parents, is a white man whose website prominently displays white Hamilton county suburbanites in the background, in a county just on the border between Northern leaning Ohio and Southern leaning border state Kentucky.

To be perfectly honest, if I had been forced to vote in that election, I wouldn't have been terribly happy with either of my choices. Both candidates are partisans seeking a post that demands neutrality and evenhandedness.

Voters were very evenly split in the race, and usually, in this kind of situation, where a significant number of provisional ballots are at issue, a recount will favor a Democrat. It wouldn't be surprising for an apparently heavy handed or partial ruling to lead to a riot in Cincinnati.

The Stakes

This all sounds like a very technical issue of civil procedure and election law, with valid legal considerations on both sides of the case.

The outcome of this case won't directly affect anyone who doesn't do have a connection to Hamilton County Juvenile Court, a county where 99.7% of the population of the United States doesn't live, and with which 95%+ of the population of Hamilton County will never have any business. It has one other judge in addition to the position at stake in this election, and the Juvenile Court's rulings are very important to those who are before the court, and who in making child custody decisions and juvenile delinquency sentencing decisions has immense discretion.

Life will go on with either resolution of the matter, so long as it is resolved, and there is really no room for compromise. Neither candidate has shown any basis for a do over of the election, only one can be elected for a long term to the only judgeship on the court, and the judicial ideologies and the personal experiences that the candidates bring to the court are very different. Either way, unhappen litigants can try to appeal rulings without a proper legal basis.

Cote D'Ivoire Compared

But, while this particular case in Ohio won't change the world, an extremely similar legal issue in Cote D'Ivoire's 2010 Presidential election, in West Africa, in a country only a little larger in size and area than Ohio (it has 20.6 million people up by a third in the last decade alone, while Ohio has about 11.5 million although probably a similar number of adults of voting age; it has 124,502 square miles, while Ohio has 44,825 square miles; both have strong regional and ethnic partisan divides), in which a Board of Elections and independent election observers came to one conclusion on the outcome of a contested election dispute arising out of vote counting concerns (in favor of the contesting candidate Alassane Ouattara), while the Constitutional Court of the country came to a contrary determination (in favor of the incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo).

The election dispute in Cote D'Ivoire has brought that country to the brink of civil war, despite the absence of a complicated mix of federal courts. Scores or hundreds of people have died already in the several week old dispute. The international community has sided with the challenger (in part on the merits, and in part because the incumbent has manipulated the electoral process in undemocratic ways that were to be put behind the country in free and fair elections in 2010), while the incumbent appears to have practical control of most instruments of state power in the country.

UPDATE: The 6th Circuit has entered a stay in the case. All the original source documents you could ever want can be found here.

READ MORE - Ivory Coast Type Election Issues In Cincinnati

Colorado GOP Oblivious To Budget Reality

The dominant problem facing the Colorado General Assembly as it begins its 2011 legislative session is that the state needs to close a $1 billion gap in its $7 billion general fund budget.

So, what legislative proposals are GOP state legislators, who campaigned on fiscal responsibility offering at this critical juncture?

* Income tax cuts for parents who send their children to private schools.
* A repeal of hospital fees.
* Sales tax cuts for agricultural products producers.

What part of "we're broke" did they not see in the memo on the state budget? Cutting revenue is a wonderful thing, unless you can't pay your bills.

Bills to make it harder to register to vote are also on the Republican agenda.

READ MORE - Colorado GOP Oblivious To Budget Reality